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I. ABSTRACT
The recent impeachment of President Bill Clinton has
called attention to the only other presidential impeachment in
American history, that of Andrew Johnson in 1868. Parallels
between the two cases have been drawn to suggest that both
were unjustified attacks on the presidency by a partisan Con-
gress. Such comparisons have also suggested that the
Clinton impeachment will result in a weakened presidency,
just as the Johnson impeachment ushered in an era of con-
gressional government in the nineteenth century. This paper
argues that such comparisons are misguided. Although both
impeachments were organized along partisan lines, the John-
son impeachment, unlike the Clinton impeachment, was con-
stitutionally substantive, constructive rather than mechanical
in its constitutional application, and focused squarely on the
presidency as an institution. Both the substantive content
and the political context of the Johnson impeachment con-
tributed to a weakening of the presidency. The Clinton Im-
peachment, by contrast, is unlikely to have any significant,
long-term institutional implications. A comparison of the two
impeachments also counsels against formalistic efforts to
further define "high crimes and misdemeanors."
A sense of constitutional failure hangs over the recent im-
peachment of President William Jefferson Clinton. Although
the wisdom of the procedural difficulty of removing a Presi-
dent has been celebrated,' there is a lingering sense that the
constitutional system as a whole suffered from the recent epi-
sode. Although many were critical of the substance of the
particular charges against the President, the impeachment
also seemed to lack a certain constitutional gravity. The con-
* Assistant Professor of Politics, Princeton University. I thank Fred Greenstein,
Michael Kiarman, Mark Graber, and Sandy Levinson for their useful comments and
conversations.
See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, And the Winner Is..., N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 1999,
at A27.
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stitutional discourse surrounding the impeachment was sur-
prisingly thin, and analysis of the impeachment generally
emphasized the familiar script of partisan politics and politi-
cal handicapping.2
In looking for a context for the recent impeachment, it is
not surprising that many turned to the only previous example
of a presidential impeachment, that of Andrew Johnson in
1868. Given the fortunate rarity of presidential impeach-
ments, the search for appropriate standards and procedures
for such an event required going back more than a century
for adequate precedents.3 But many also looked to the John-
son !impeachment for more substantive parallels to current
events. Johnson has once again been portrayed as a martyr
to the partisan ambitions of the Reconstruction-Era Republi-
can Congress.5 The Republican senators who provided the
crucial votes to acquit Johnson were once again lauded as
"profiles in courage" who saved the presidency itself.6 As the
impeachment inquiry began, commentators began to worry
publicly that we were moving toward a "system of parlia-
mentary government."7  As the process concluded, it was
readily pronounced that Clinton's offenses fell somewhere
between the clear case in favor of removing Richard Nixon
and the clear mistake of the Johnson impeachment. 8 Presi-
dential historian Arthur Schlesinger Jr. has been the most
prominent in predicting future constitutional developments
2 See, e.g., Richard L. Berke, Polls Find Most Americans Still Oppose Impeachment
and Now Frown on the G.O.P.. N. Y. TimES, Dec. 15. 1998. at A24; Howard Fineman
& Matthew Cooper. The New Impeachment War. NEwS\VEEK. Oct. 10. 1998. at 28:
Robert Kuttner, Don't Count on the Senate to Acquit. BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 20. 1998. at
C7.
3 By coincidence, Chief Justice William Rehnquist had written a book on the
Johnson impeachment that became a prime source for historical precedents and
context for participants in the Clinton impeachment See WILIA2MA H. REHNQUIST.
GRAND INQuESTS 199-248 (1992).
4 See. e.g., Cass R. Sunstein. Impeaching the President. 147 U. PA. L REV. 279.
281 n.7, 295 (1998); Bruce Ackerman. What Ken Starr Neglected to Tell Us. N.Y.
TIMES, Sept 14, 1998, at A23 [hereinafter Ken Start; Adam Cohen. An Impeachment
Long Ago: Andrew Johnson's Saga. TMIE, Dec. 21. 1998. at 28: Alan Dershowitz.
How Trial of the Century WVI Likely Unfold In the Senate, USA TODAY. Dec. 21. 1998.
at 27A; Thomas Oliphant. The GOP's Real Purpose, BOSTON GLOBE. Dec. 20. 1998. at
C7; David E. Rosenbaum. Effects on the Presidency Uncertain, but Certainly Lasting.
N.Y. TIMIs, Dec. 14. 1998. at A28; Betsy McCaughey Ross. Rehnqulst Holds Key to
Impeachment, USA TODAY, OcL 19. 1998. at 27A.
See, e.g., Ross, supra note 4.
6 See Cohen, supra note 4; Robert L. Jackson. The Impeachment Debate, L.A.
TI1MES, Dec. 19, 1998, at A34; Robert A. Jordan. Wanted* An Edmund G. Ross to
Save Us from Ourselves. BOSTON GLOBE. Dec. 13. 1998, at D4; David Stout. Family of
"Ruined" Senator Recalls aLegacy of Honor, N.Y. TZIES. Jan. 17. 1999. at 31.
7 Ackerman, Ken Star, supra note 4. at A23.
" See Ronald Dworkln. The Wounded ConstitutionL N.Y. REV. BOOKS. Mar. 18.
1999, at 8 (quoting William A. Edmundson).
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based on the aftermath of the Clinton impeachment, con-
cluding that "[tihe failed impeachment of Andrew Johnson left
a wounded, weakened Presidency, one that lasted for many
years, and I think the failed impeachment of Bill Clinton will
do the same thing."9
Although there is little question that both the Johnson
and Clinton impeachments were organized along party lines,10
the two impeachments were otherwise quite dissimilar. Un-
like the recent impeachment of Clinton, the Johnson im-
peachment featured a rich and substantively important con-
stitutional debate, demonstrating that partisanship is not
necessarily a barrier to valuable constitutional politics. Re-
cent events have served to bury a whole generation of schol-
arship on the Johnson episode that had helped rehabilitate
the Reconstruction-Era Congress and explain the impeach-
ment." Revisiting the Johnson impeachment at this point Is
necessary not only to recover the historical significance of
those events, but also to clarify the nature of the impeach-
ment power itself. Although they failed to remove the Presi-
dent from office, the Reconstruction-Era Republicans were far
more successful in justifying their actions and mobilizing po-
litical support for their impeachment effort. They under-
stood, as modem-day congressional Republicans did not, that
the impeachment power is not a technical instrument for
punishing those who commit "impeachable offenses" but
rather is a powerful tool for interpreting our constitutional
inheritance. As a consequence, the early Republicans were
far less concerned with applying some abstract standard of
"high crimes and misdemeanors" than with defining the
boundaries of presidential power in a republic.
An important lesson of the Clinton impeachment is a
9 R.W. Apple Jr., The Fallout of the Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1999, at Al (quoting
Schlesinger).10 See Partisanship and Impeachment, CONG. RESEARCHER, Mar. 19, 1999, at 250.
No Democrat voted to support any of the articles of impeachment against Andrew
Johnson in either the House or the Senate. In the House, Republican support for
the articles was unanimous, except for the tenth article from which eleven dissented
and seven abstained. In the Senate, seven Republicans voted not guilty. See
MICHAEL LES BENEDICT, THE IMPEACHMENT AND TRIAL OF ANDREW JOHNSON 113-14, 173
(1973) [hereinafter IMPEACHMENTI.
11 See, e.g., BENEDICT, IMPEACHMENT, supra note 10 (offering a reanalysis of John-
son's impeachment); W.R. BROCK, AN AMERICAN CRISIS (1963) (discussing the role of
Congress in Reconstruction); ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION 176-411 (1988) (analyz-
ing Johnson's failure during Reconstruction); ERIC L. MCKITRICK, ANDREW JOHNSON
AND RECONSTRUCTION (1960) (same); HANS L. TREFOUSSE, IMPEACHMENT OF A PRESIDENT
(1975) (same); Michael Les Benedict, A New Look at the Impeachment of Andrew
Johnson, 88 POL. SCI. Q. 349 (1973) (discussing reluctance of Congress to Impeach
Johnson); David Donald, Why They Impeached Andrew Johnson, AM. HERITAGE, Dec.
1956, at 21 (discussing Johnson's political blunders leading up to his Impeachment).
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warning against an excessive constitutional formalism that
emphasizes textual exegesis at the expense of careful delib-
eration on substantive public values. The example of the
Clinton impeachment should not lead us into new efforts to
further refine the meaning of the phrase "high crimes and
misdemeanors" or to demand that future impeachments be
consensual, bipartisan affairs.12  Presidential behavior that
might warrant impeachment is hard to predict beforehand,
and the presidency will always attract partisan defenders as
well as partisan critics. Bipartisan impeachment inquiries
may be expected only when the wrongdoings of the targeted
officials are beyond question, and the party of the target has
more to gain by distancing themselves from that particular
government official than from defending him. Some of our
most important impeachments, however, have turned on
contested principles, in which partisanship is a vehicle for
altering public understandings of what the Constitution re-
quires.' Such was the case in the Johnson impeachment,
when the Republican and Democratic parties were divided by
their constitutional visions as well as by their electoral fates.
The impeachment of Andrew Johnson did help foster the
congressional government of the late nineteenth century, but
both the broader political context and the substance of the
impeachment itself distinguish the Johnson from the Clinton
impeachment. Although the trial of Andrew Johnson did
have significant institutional and constitutional ramifications,
the implications of the trial of Bill Clinton are likely to be
much more personal and paltry. This Article will explain why
the Johnson impeachment was so constitutionally successful
and why the Clinton impeachment is unlikely to have much
constitutional significance.14 Part II explains how the John-
son impeachment was centrally about presidential power and
the ways in which the impeachment worked in complement
with other political factors to strengthen the Congress at the
expense of the presidency. Part Ill more briefly highlights the
limited and personal character of the Clinton impeachment.
12 See Sunstein. supra note 4. at 314 (arguing that impeachment along partisan
lines casts doubt on its validity).
13 See KErrH E. WHrNM1GrON, CONSTrnMoNAL CONSTrRuCno: 20-71. 113-57 (1999)
(discussing the impeachments of Justice Samuel Chase and President Andrew John-
son).
14 An impeachment can have constitutional significance in two ways: by redefin-
ing appropriate political behavior or by redefining the scope of the impeachment
power itself. My primary concern here is with the former. Ultimately. I do not be-
lieve that the Clinton impeachment pushed very hard on the historical boundaries of
the impeachment power, and thus is likely to have little long-term significance in re-
shaping the definition of Impeachable offenses, but I do not pursue that argument
here.
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The Article concludes in Part IV by suggesting how the mod-
em political and constitutional system insures continuing
presidential power despite the recent impeachment and how
that impeachment emphasizes the importance of constitu-
tional politics.
I. THE JOHNSON IMPEACHMENT, PRESIDENrIAL POWER,
AND CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT
The Johnson impeachment was centrally about presiden-
tial power. Just as the Civil War, sparked by the particular
issue of slavery, was both structured by and reconstructed
federalism, so the particular issue of Reconstruction placed
the presidency at issue. The conflict between Johnson and
the Republican Congress over government policy toward the
South and the freedmen both motivated the impeachment
and helped focus it on the question of presidential power."
Johnson occupied the presidency in a period of great consti-
tutional flux. Within that context, his actions as President
were seen as both constitutionally innovative and deeply
threatening to the health of the republic. 6 His impeachment
was designed not only to overcome a temporary obstruction
to a partisan congressional majority, but also to reestablish a
set of constitutional norms and practices that would endure
after the Johnson presidency had expired.'
7
Section A establishes the importance of the political and
constitutional context of Reconstruction for the impeach-
ment. Reconstruction and the shadow of the Civil War cre-
ated a crisis atmosphere and sense of constitutional instabil-
ity that critically shaped the interaction between Congress
and the White House. Moreover, the unique nature of Recon-
struction raised important institutional questions as to who
would set national policy as the nation transitioned from war
to peace. Section B then sketches out the several ways in
which Johnson was an aggressor in pushing the boundaries
of presidential power and why his opponents readily per-
ceived such actions as abusive. Finally, Section C indicates
the ideological and material resources supporting the con-
gressional reaction against Johnson and the institution of
.congressional goverment."
is See WHITINGTON, supra note 13, at 116.
16 See icL
17 See fUi at 117.
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A. The Political Context of the Johnson Impeachment
The overarching political context of the Johnson presi-
dency was Reconstruction itself.'8 The question of what to do
with the Southern states and the freedmen after the conclu-
sion of military conflict was already becoming a central issue
when Johnson was chosen as Abraham Lincoln's running
mate on the presidential ticket of the National Union Party in
1864.'" Resolution of the issue promised to have a significant
impact on the constitutional and political future of the nation
as a whole, but the proper character of an eventual peace re-mained severely underdetermined by the Union's justifica-
tions for war. The Republican Party's war aims set certain
minimu m conditions for a successful conclusion of the war,
but the actual details of any settlement threatened to fracture
the party into different camps. On this precarious landscape.
Johnson staked out a relatively extreme position, helping to
unify the Republican Party against his presidency."m The bat-
tles over Reconstruction were of extraordinary intensity and
importance, elevating policy and partisan disputes into tests
of constitutional fidelity. In that superheated environment,
Johnson struggled against the politically dominant tides. In
order to overcome his political opposition, Johnson pushed
the envelope of presidential powers. In the context of the
times, such challenges were unlikely to be tolerated.
Conflicts between Congress and the President over Recon-
struction policy began even before the war was over.2' As
Union armies began to capture Southern territory, Lincoln
came under fierce attack from the more radical members of
his party. They objected to his practice of countermanding
the orders of generals that emancipated slaves and his deci-
sion to replace the particularly antislavery General John
Fremont with the Democrat John McClellan in the West.22 As
the war was winding to a close and Union armies occupied
Louisiana, Lincoln imposed the so-called "Ten Percent" plan
is See BENEDICT. IMPEACHIMENT. supra note 10. at 1-25; FONER. supra note 11. at
333-38; MCKrrRICK. supra note 11. at 486-509. Building on revisionist historiogra-
phy. Bruce Ackerman has recently and inslghtfully examined the Johnson im-
peachment in constitutional terms that emphasize the centrality of Reconstruction.
For Ackerman, Johnson's impeachment was centrally about the Fourteenth Amend-
merit. In pursuing his theory of constitutional regimes and informal amendments.
however, Ackerman obscures the institutional Issues at stake in the impeachment
that are emphasized here. See 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN. WE THE PEOPLE 209-30 (1998)
[hereinafter 2 ACKERmAN].
9 ee FONER, supra note 11. at 43-46.
20 See WILIAhM A. DUNNING. RECONS7RUCTION 51-52 (1907].
21 See FONER, supra note 11. at 35-76; MCKrrRICK. supra note 11, at 120-51.
22 eeWHITINGTON. supra note 13. at 118.
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for Reconstruction, which would allow Southern states to re-
establish civilian governments once ten percent of the pre-
war voting population swore its loyalty to the Union.23 Lin-
coln's plan angered congressional Republicans both because
it claimed to settle this critically important policy by executive
fiat without legislative consultation, and because, in the eyes
of congressional leaders, it set the price for Southern read-
mission into the Union too low.24 When Lincoln pocket-vetoed
legislation to overturn the Ten Percent plan, its sponsors,
Senator Benjamin Wade and Congressman Henry Davis, is-
sued a joint statement bitterly denouncing Lincoln for his
dictatorial actions and reasserting congressional supremacy
over the terms of peace.' The 1864 victory of the National
Union ticket was only a temporary break from what promised
to be a critical confrontation between Congress and the
President over the course of Reconstruction.
The assassination of Lincoln just days after the Southern
surrender at Appomatox and weeks after the presidential
election briefly lessened the tension over who would set the
terms of peace. For many Radicals, the ascension of Andrew
Johnson to the presidency was welcomed as a blessing.
Though a Democrat from Tennessee, Johnson had opposed
secession and, unlike many of his brethren, chose to stay in
Washington after his state left the Union. When Union troops
occupied Tennessee, Johnson was appointed military gover-
nor and exercised his powers with vigor, frequently repeating
the slogan that "Itreason must be made odious and traitors
punished."26 In the context of civil war, Johnson's Jackso-
nian nationalism complemented Republican efforts. Like-
wise, his populist antipathy to the slaveholding elite gave him
a common enemy with the Republican Radicals.
Johnson quickly dashed Radical hopes, however. The
Southern surrender and Lincoln's death came during the
lengthy nineteenth century congressional recess. Rather
than calling a special session of Congress, Johnson followed
Lincoln's example in directing the military to prepare the
Southern states for a return to civilian control of the govern-
ment.2 Johnson also followed Lincoln's relatively moderate
plan for Reconstruction, as well as his example of presidential
reconstruction. 29 Johnson's "policy has been one which was
23 See MCKITRICK, supra note 11, at 131-33.
24 See BROCK, supra note 11. at 23-24.
25 See FONER, supranote 11, at 61.
26 FONER, supranote 11. at 43; seealso icL at 177, 178.
27 See MCKITRICK, supra note 11, at 134-74.
See FONER, supranote 11, at 181-84.
29 See DUNNING, supra note 20. at 35.
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intended to restore the glorious Union - to bring those great
States... to their original relations to the Government of the
United States."3 As always, Johnson understood the war to
be a legal, not a constitutional, crisis. The President's obli-
gation was to quell a massive outbreak of lawlessness and re-
store civil order. Using the force of executive order and mar-
tial law and the leverage of a conditional presidential pardon,
Johnson quickly oversaw the dismantling of the Confederate
government, the dissolution of its armies, and the legal aboli-
tion of slavery.3' By the time Congress met in regular session,
Johnson was able to present restored state governments with
new constitutions, a generally pacified Southern countryside,
and a cohort of newly elected federal representatives and
senators.'
The congressional reaction was swift, though hostilities
between congressional Republicans and the President grew at
a slower pace. The Republican caucus directed the House
clerk to exclude the names of the Southern representatives
from the roll, and the Thirty-Ninth Congress refused to seat
them until the legislature had determined for itself the status
of the Southern states. Congress formed the Joint Com-
mittee on Reconstruction to examine the situation.? The
Joint Committee first refused to readmit Johnson's home
state of Tennessee, which had been under Northern occupa-
tion since 1862, until further conditions were met. Two
days later, Johnson surprised Congress by vetoing the
Freedmen's Bureau Bill.4 Three days after that (in a speech
on Washington's birthday), Johnson denounced Republican
leaders as extremists no better than the secessionists in a
speech on Washington's birthday.7 Congress narrowly over-
rode Johnson's veto of the next major piece of Reconstruction
legislation, the 1866 Civil Rights Act.' It was the first time a
presidential veto of a major piece of legislation was defeated.
Likewise, the Fourteenth Amendment was sent to the states
for ratification over Johnson's objections.9 The midterm con-
President Andrew Johnson, Speech of 22d February, 1866. In POLrnCAL HISTORY
OF THE UNITED STATES OF MERcA DURING THE PERIOD OF RECONSTRUCTION 58 (Edvard
McPherson ed., 1871) [hereinafter POIMTICALHISTORYI (emphasis added).
31 See FONER, supranote 11, at 181-84. 190-93.
See d. at 176-226; President Andrew Johnson. Speech of 22d February. 1866.
in POlITICAL HISTORY. supra note 30.
See DUNNING, supra note 20. at 51-52.
3 See &L
35 See BROCK, supra note 11. at 132-34. 138-39.
See DUNNING, supra note 20. at 60.
See BROCK, suprmnote 11, at 110-11.
See iuL at 114.
See it. at 148.
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gressional elections of 1866 were bitterly contested by John-
son and largely focused on the Reconstruction issue." The
Republicans themselves offered a relatively conservative Re-
construction program that, combined with a well publicized
riot in New Orleans, gave them a decisive victory at the
polls.4 ' Congress easily overrode the President's veto on every
subsequent piece of Reconstruction legislation, often on the
same day it was issued.42  Congress isolated the President
from the administration of Reconstruction policy, writing leg-
islation so as to eliminate presidential discretion and prohibit
him from removing executive officers or altering the military
chain of command without congressional approval.'
Reconstruction dramatically raised the stakes for the
eventual impeachment of Andrew Johnson. Despite Republi-
can electoral and legislative victory, Johnson had continued
to hamper the execution of congressional policy and, more
importantly, had encouraged the South to resist Reconstruc-
tion.' The articles of impeachment passed by the House rep-
resented the fourth impeachment attempt against Johnson,
each more credible and better supported than the last, as
congressional frustration with presidential obstruction grew.45
This successful impeachment was precipitated by Johnson's
effort unilaterally to remove his Secretary of War arguably in
violation of the Tenure of Office Act, which required Senate
confirmation before cabinet members could be removed from
office. 46 The Secretary of War, in particular, was a key posi-
tion for implementing military Reconstruction. Lincoln's
holdover appointee, Edwin Stanton, took his instructions
from congressional Radicals and was no longer on speaking
terms with the President.47 Reconstruction was both a key
motivation and backdrop for the impeachment and trial of the
President, and the future course of the nation seemed to be at
stake in the battle. Disagreements between Congress and the
40 See id. at 155.
41 See BENEDICT, IMPEACHMENT, supra note 10, at 14-15 (characterizing the Re-
publican program as "conservative"); BROCK, supra note 11, at 153-59 (describing the
New Orleans Riot).
42 See ROBERTJ. SPrFZER, THE PRESIDENTIAL VETO 59 (1988).
See FONER, supra note 11, at 261-70, 291-33; MCKrrIjCK, supra note 11. at
274-324. 422-28, 473-84.
44 See BENEDICT, IMPEACHMENT, supra note 10, at 16.
45 See MCKITRICK, supra note 11, at 491-509.
46 See id. at 506. Johnson and his attorney disputed whether Stanton was cov-
ered by the Act. See d.
47 Johnson had tried once before to remove Stanton. He first chose General U.S.
Grant as Stanton's replacement, but after consulting with congressional Republi-
cans, the General withdrew from the position and returned to army headquarters.
Stanton promptly barricaded himself in his office at the War Department. See kd at
495-504.
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President could no longer be regarded as normal matters of
tolerable policy differences. For both sides in the dispute, the
constitutional significance of Reconstruction left little room
for compromise and called into question the good faith and
political legitimacy of the opposition.
Reconstruction was also fundamentally a matter of sub-
stantive policy, and thus the resolution of the issue carried
important institutional implications. The extraordinary im-
portance of Reconstruction gave all parties a strong interest
in the ultimate resolution. The character of Reconstruction
as a matter of domestic policy also lent additional significance
to the question of how and by whom the matter would be re-
solved. Although increasingly controversial as the war pro-
gressed, Lincoln's actions could at least be justified as im-
plicit in the extraordinary presidential power to conduct war.
With the war officially over and the character of the domestic
peace at stake, Johnson's efforts to control Reconstruction
reminded congressional Republicans of their Whig ancestors'
complaints about the presidency of "KingoAndy" Jackson,
Johnson's namesake and political mentor. In these early
stages of Reconstruction, the future of the national govern-
ment and federal policy was not yet clear. In opposing Re-
construction, Johnson located domestic policymaking
authority in the presidency and the states. Republican Re-
construction, by contrast, became identical to Reconstruction
by Congress. Congressional supremacy seemed both neces-
sary to and implied by the Republican commitment to Recon-
struction.
A second dimension of the political context of the Johnson
impeachment was its proximity to the Civil War. The exigen-
cies of war had long been recognized to give the President ex-
traordinary powers, but war had also been recognized as a
particularly dangerous time for democracies and republics.
Although Republicans generally supported Lincoln's presi-
dential war powers, the implications of such power within the
context of a civil war were nonetheless shocking, as in his
unilateral suspension of habeas corpus and the emancipation
of slaves.49 Doubts about Lincoln's leadership led to the for-
mation by Congress of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of
the War to examine the policies of the Commander in Chief.0
48 Alfred H. Kelly, Comment on Harold M. Hyman's Paper. In NEW FROIIERS OF THE
AMRICAN RECONSTRUC'InON 40. 51 (Harold M. Hyman ed.. 1966).
49 See generally J.G. RANDALL, CONSnT=ONAL PROBLEMS UNDER LINCOLN (1964)
(discussing the Habeas Corpus Act of 1863 and the Emancipation Proclamation
among other examples of the expansion of presidential power under Lincoln).
50 See generally STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE POLMICS PRESIDErS MAKE 215-27
(1993) [hereinafter POLITICS] (noting Lincoln's tenuous relationship with Radicals in
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Andrew Johnson's occupancy of the expanded presidency
more seriously alarmed Republicans. Johnson's military
restoration of the South was justified under his own concep-
tion of his war powers, which were extensive enough to re-
constitute state governments, authorize elections, and rewrite
state constitutions. 51  Northern Republicans found those
powers rather more ominous when the President began to
compare congressional Radicals with the secessionists and
pledged to defend the Constitution against those whom he
thought might trample it. 52 Unlike its Confederate counter-
part, the Union army had not been demobilized after the
Southern surrender, and troops still filled Washington. In a
period of constitutional upheaval and deep political division,
the transition from war to peace had not yet been made, and
neither Congress nor the President was confident that the
other would respect the authority of its office. In particular,
Congress had both immediate fears of a presidential dictator-
ship backed by the military and more forward looking con-
cerns regarding how much power the President might retain
in the postbellum era, especially one in which half the nation
would still be under martial law for the foreseeable future.
A final and less unique aspect of the political context sur-
rounding the first presidential impeachment was Johnson's
standing relative to the majority party. In political scientist
Stephen Skowronek's words, Johnson was a preemptive
President, a Democratic interruption of a Republican re-
gime.- In historian Eric McKitrick's more familiar terms,
Johnson was an outsider in the capital.55 Thomas Nelson
opened his defense of the President at the impeachment trial
by describing Johnson as "a democrat of the straightest of
strict constructionists; an old Jacksonian, Jeffersonian
democrat." " This description was meant to explain the
President's anomalous behavior in the Republican dominated
the Congress); JAMES M. MCPHERSON, BATrLE CRY OF FREEDOM 348-65 (1988) (ex-
plaining that the issue of emancipation exacerbated the rift between Lincoln and the
congressional Radicals).
5 See generally MCKrIRICK, supra note 11, at 100-10 (describing the "presidential
theory" of Reconstruction).
52 See President Andrew Johnson, Speech of 22d February, 1866, in POLITICAL
HISTORY, supra note 30, at 60-61 (stating that members of Congress were "opposed to
the fundamental principles of this Government, and as now laboring to destroy
them").
See 1 TRIAL OF ANDREW JOHNSON ON IMPEACHMENT 26, 112-13, 115 (De Capo
Press 1970) (1868) [hereinafter 1 TRIAL]; 2 TRIAL OF ANDREw JOHNSON ON IMPEACHMENT
112 (De Capo Press 1970) (1868) [hereinafter 2 TRIAL].
See SKOWRONEK, POLITICS, supra note 50, at 34-45.
55 See MCKRrICK, supra note 11, at 85-92.
2 TRIAL, supra note 53, at 123.
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capital. But not only did Republicans dominate Congress,
many Republicans also believed that the Civil War had been
fought precisely against the Jeffersonian strict construction-
ism of the Democratic Party.57 In 1868, the Republicans held
a larger proportion of seats in the House and Senate than any
party since the Era of Good Feelings, a margin not matched
again until 1936.5" At least to the Republicans, the Demo-
crats were tainted by their association with secession and
slavery. The Jacksonian Johnson had been added to the
1864 presidential ticket as an effort to portray the war as a
national rather than partisan effort and to help win over con-
servative voters.5 9  Lincoln's death elevated a man to the
presidency with few ties to the Republican leadership and lit-
tie commitment to the long-term health of the Republican
Party. Indeed, Johnson recognized that his own electoral
hopes in 1868 depended either on his nomination by the
Democratic Party or the formation of a real National Union
Party, and his administration was largely composed of and
supported by Democrats and disaffected conservative Repub-
licans.' His largest and most impassioned base of support
was in the disenfranchised South.
Johnson was politically isolated within Washington, with
few allies and even fewer supporters who had a real stake in
the longevity of his administration. Moreover, Johnson's
electoral and policy goals and ideological commitments were
at odds with the most fundamental tenets of an ascendant
Republican Party that was looking to consolidate its military
victory before the South regained the suffrage.0 Johnson was
an "accidental" President in the most extreme sense of the
term, and he had little political authority with which to chal-
lenge the Republican Congress for control of the government
or to protect his presidency from a congressional 
reaction.6
These factors led Johnson to seek to maximize his formal
powers as President in order to make his mark on the gov-
ernment. They also made him vulnerable to a Republican re-
action.
57 See Kelly, supru note 48, at 49-54.
' See KENNETH C. MARrS. THE HISTORICAL AThAS OF POLIlCAL PARTIES IN THE UNITED
STATES CONGRESS, 1789-1989 (1989).
59 See DUNNING, supra note 20. at 18.
60 See BROCK, supra note 11, at 160-65; FONER, supra note 11, at 216-20;
MCKITRICK, supra note 11. at 377-420.
61 See FONER, supra note 11. at 268-69.
62 See DUNNING, supra note 20. at 51-70.
See SKOWRONEK, supra note 50. at 43-45.
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B. Johnson as Constitutional Innovator
Until a relatively recent round of revisionist scholarship,
Johnson was often portrayed in both scholarly and popular
literature as a passive victim of congressional aggression. 6
This portrait was facilitated by the fact that the Republicans
were clear constitutional innovators, reconceptualizing the
basic ends of union and devising new means for advancing
those ends. The impeachment effort was seen as among the
less fortunate of their innovations, but consistent with the
Republicans' willingness to experiment with and manipulate
the inherited Constitution.6 Johnson, by contrast, was un-
derstood to be a hapless defender of the old order and, in the
end, a near martyr for the presidency.'
But Johnson was a constitutional innovator in his own
right. He pressed the powers of the presidency to their full-
est, while arguing for a greatly enhanced, vastly empowered
office. Johnson came to the office with models of the Jackson
and Lincoln presidencies in mind. As his conflict with Con-
gress intensified, Johnson built on his inheritance to defend a
distinctly new type of presidency that would fit within a re-
configured constitutional order. Although these innovations
were at least plausible extrapolations of the founders' institu-
tion and his predecessors' practice, his contemporaries who
shared neither his substantive goals nor his presidential per-
spective readily saw them as gross abuses. Though many of
Johnson's actions would be unobjectionable in the modem
context, they were both extraordinary and highly objection-
able to congressional Republicans. His innovations came as
popular leader, independent constitutional actor, and as a
party leader.
In an era when strong political parties were seen as neces-
sary mechanisms of popular government, Johnson sought to
reconfigure the President as a popular leader with unmedi-
ated access to the electorate.6r The Washington Birthday
speech itself was a surprising gambit by Johnson. The
See MCKITRICK, supra note 11, at 486-90 (summarizing the various interpreta-
tions of the Johnson impeachment).
5 See id. at 487-88.
See, e.g., HOWARD K. BEALE, THE CRITICAL YEAR (1930); WILFRED E. BINKLEY,
PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS 156-77 (3d rev. ed. 1962); LOUIs BROWNLOW, THE PRESIDENT
AND THE PRESIDENCY 58 (1949); DUNNING, supra note 20; JOHN F. KENNEDY, PROFILES IN
COURAGE 126-27 (1961); LouIs W. KOENIG, THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE 70 (1964); GEORGE
MILTON, THE AGE OF HATE (1930); CLINTON ROSSiTER, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 52,
79-80 (1960).
67 See generally JOEL H. SILBEY, THE AMERICAN POLITICAL NATION 124-40 (1991)
(discussing parties as "the life-blood of the Republic").
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speech came in response to a traditional serenade of the
President from the White House lawn and, rather than giving
the usual ceremonial thanks, the President launched into an
emotional political tirade.' Although generally a solemn fig-
ure, Johnson had always been an emotional stump speaker
who liked to mix it up with the crowd. As a senator, John-
son's speeches "were reasoned arguments, more like a law-
yer's brief than a stump harangue. But... he repeatedly-
almost uniformly-- burst forth in fiery rhetoric whenever he
faced a crowd of partisans."' Oratory was a basic political
skill of the nineteenth century, but previous Presidents had
set it aside as beneath the dignity of the office and potentially
dangerous in a representative democracy. At the time of the
founding, demagoguery was seen as a central threat to the
stability of democratic regimes, and popular rhetoric was as-
sociated with the power to sway the masses behind a charis-
matic leader who would break the fetters of constitutional of-
fice.70 Early nineteenth century Presidents had limited their
public speeches to espousing constitutional pieties and patri-
otic platitudes, and many limited their public appearances to
formal occasions, such as inaugurals.
7 ' As the patrician
politics of the founding era gave way to the more rough-and-
tumble style of party politics, the grounds of presidential
authority were reconceptualized. Presidential authority was
seen to derive less from the constitutional office and the good
character of its occupant than from the web of party connec-
tions that extended out from the White House. The presi-
dency was the crown jewel of the victorious party and the
presidential candidate himself was to be a partisan fiure-
head chosen by convention delegates for that purpose. Al-
though some antebellum Presidents had been relatively active
campaigners, popular support for the President was under-
stood to be mediated through a political party.
Johnson was raised within that system, but soon found
himself to be a President without a party. He attempted to
make up for his lack of party support within Washington by
See BROCK, supranote 11. at 110-11.
James D. Barber, Adult Identity and Presidential Style: The Rhetorical Empha-
sis. 97 DAEDALUS 938, 949 (1968).
70 See JAMES W. CEASER. PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION 52-61 (1979) (discussing the
Founders' fears of "popular leadership"): JEFFREY K. TUUiS. THE RHETORICAL
PRESIDENCY 27-33 (1987) (discussing the view that demagoguery Is a danger to de-
mocracy).
71 See TUS, supra note 70. at 47-87.
72 See CEASER, supra note 70, at 158.
73 See generally id. at 123-69; RALPH KETCHAM, PRESIDE=TS ABOVE PARIY 141-65
(1984).
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recurring to the people in the countryside. As he became
convinced that the Republican Party in Congress was an in-
cestuous cabal, Johnson offered himself to the people as their
true representative in the government. 74 Having not yet won
an election in his own right, he appealed to the people in
1866 to show their support for him indirectly by defeating his
enemies in Congress. 5 Besides several speeches in Wash-
ington, Johnson embarked on a national speaking tour in
1866, the "Swing Around the Circle."7 6 The tour itself was not
unprecedented- previous Presidents had left Washington to
tour the nation as well- but its substance and purpose were
novel. The tour, which began with the bipartisan trappings of
the ceremonial presidency, quickly took a partisan turn as
Johnson used his speeches to deliver ringing denunciations
of the Republicans and urged his audiences to vote against
them in the upcoming election. 77
Johnson's speeches were highly personal, as he asked his
listeners for their support in his battle against the Congress.
The authority that he sought from the people was not for a
party but for himself. 8 Referring to Republican officeholders,
Johnson assured his listeners that "if you will stand by me in
trying to give the people a fair chance... I will kick them out.
I will kick them out just as fast as I can." 9 After the antici-
pated groundswell of popular support failed to materialize in
the 1866 election returns, Johnson appealed to his own si-
lent, and silenced, majority to justify his actions against the
rump Congress. He defended the idea of a popular presi-
dency, arguing both that the President was himself a direct
representative of the popular will and that he drew support
from the uniquely national nature of his constituency for his
role as a tribune of the people. 8° Johnson challenged the rep-
resentative warrants of Congress with his own more personal,
democratic claims. Congressional Republicans saw this ef-
74 See BENEDICT, IMPEACHMENT, supra note 10, at 5.
75 See DUNNING, supra note 20, at 81.
76 MCKITRICK, supra note 11. at 428.
77 See id. at 428-29; see also TULIS, supra note 70, at 87-88.78 See MCKrr1RcK, supra note 11, at 293-95, 430-37; President Andrew Johnson.
Speech of 22d February, 1866, in POLICAL HISTORY, supra note 30, at 61.
79 MCKRICK, supra note 11, at 390.
80 See President Andrew Johnson, Veto of the Freedmen's Bureau Bill (February
19, 1866), in PoLrrcAL HISTORY, supranote 30, at 71.
81 See President Andrew Johnson, Message Respecting the Proposed Constitu-tional Amendment on Representation, &c. (June 22, 1866), in POLITcAL HISTORY, Su-
pra note 30, at 83; President Andrew Johnson, On Receiving the Proceedings of the
Philadelphia 14th of August Convention (Aug. 18, 1866). In POLrICAL HISTORY, supra
note 30, at 127; President Andrew Johnson, Speech of 22d February, 1866, In
POLITICAL HISTORY, supra note 30, at 60; President Andrew Johnson, Veto of the Re-
construction Bill (Mar. 27, 1867), in PoLrTcAL HISTORY, supra note 30, at 172.
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fort to go over the heads of the "people's representatives" by
appeal directly to the people themselves as an invitation to
anarchy and tyranny and made that attempt the basis of an
article of impeachment against Johnson.*
Johnson's political weakness also forced him to develop
expansive claims for the independent authority of his consti-
tutional office. Johnson portrayed the President as an inde-
pendent actor and policymaker within the constitutional
system and not merely as an agent of the congressional ma-
jority.83 Reconstruction itself was ample evidence of John-
son's belief in the President's independent policymaking
authority. Through his unilateral powers, Johnson remade
the South in accord with his own beliefs about the appropri-
ate requirements of peace&4 Once Congress rejected his plan,
Johnson was active in resisting congressional policymaking
and advancing his own alternatives. As the Joint Committee
inquired into the status of the freedmen and lawlessness in
the former Confederacy, Johnson offered competing reports
on the situation.m As Congress legislated its own Recon-
struction policy, Johnson exercised his veto power, throwing
up obstructions more often than had any previous Presi-
dent.' Although organized Republican majorities soon ren-
dered the presidential veto moot, congressional leaders de-
nounced Johnson for abusing his constitutional powers.
Whereas Johnson argued that Congress had a constitutional
obligation to take his vetoes seriously regardless of its ability
to override, congressional Republicans asserted that the
President had a constitutional obligation to defer to legislative
judgments on policy and to cease expressing his dissent from
them.
7
Johnson actively used his appointment and executive
powers to hamper the implementation of congressional policy.
82 See CONG. GLOBE 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 1642 (1868) (listing the articles on
which Congress impeached Johnson).
See President Andrew Johnson. Veto of the Freedmen's Bureau Bill (Feb. 19.
1866), in POLITICAL HISTORY, supra note 30. at 72.
84 See DUNNING, supra note 20. at 35-42.
"5 See President Andrew Johnson. Speech of 22d February. 1866. Ln POLMCAL
HISTORY, supra note 30, at 60; President Andrew Johnson. Veto of the Civil Rights
Bill (Mar. 27, 1866). in POLrfCAL HISTORY. supra note 30. at 78; President Andrew
Johnson. Veto of the Freedmen's Bureau Bill (Feb. 19. 1866). tn POLITICAL HISTORY.
supra note 30, at 71-72.
Johnson vetoed nearly three times as many bills as any previous President and
used his regular veto more than twice as often. He also had three-quarters of his
regular vetoes overridden, by far both the largest absolute number and largest pro-
portion of overrides for any President. See PRESIDENTIAL VETOES 1989-1994 vlil-lx
(Gregory Harness ed., 1994).
See 1 TRIAL, supra note 53, at 110-13. 115-17. 120-21: The President on the
Stump, 102 N. AM. REV. 532-33. 537-38 (1866).
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He construed his cabinet to be a set of presidential policy ad-
visors obligated to help him formulate and implement his own
agenda, in sharp contrast to dominant contemporary norms
which viewed cabinet members as representatives of party
factions and the executive agents of legislative leaders.' This
dispute over who controlled the cabinet, and consequently
who could make government policy, was at the heart of the
attempted Stanton firing and the subsequent impeachment. 89
In the President's view, he and Stanton had lost their "mutual
confidence," preventing the secretary from fulfilling his con-
stitutional duties as the President's advisor and necessitating
that Stanton step aside. 90
More broadly, Johnson argued that because the President
was the chief executive, he required unfettered authority over
subordinates in the executive branch.9' Johnson insisted
that congressional policy should filter through the executive
hierarchy by way of the President rather than be directly
communicated to various executive officials.92 Efficient ex-
ecutive administration of the government required that the
President be free from congressional interference.93 Pointing
to Lincoln's rapid efforts to identify and remove Southern
sympathizers from the government after secession, Johnson
insisted on the necessity of an executive branch that an-
swered only to one master. 9
Johnson's impeachment over his violation of the Tenure of
Office Act provoked his most extreme claims on behalf of
presidential independence. With the Act, Johnson thought,
Congress had clearly exceeded its constitutional authority by
restricting legitimate presidential powers. As a consequence,
he argued, the President was free to ignore the Act and refuse
to obey or enforce it.95 Unconstitutional legislation could not
be binding on the President, and the President was obliged to
See ITRIAL, supra note 53, at 62.
The Tenure of Office Act was controversial in its own time, and former President
William Howard Taft later declared it unconstitutional. See Myers v. United States,
272 U.S. 52, 176 (1926). But it would be anachronistic to claim that Taft's twentieth
century assertion that the President had to have full control over the executive
branch settled the matter in Johnson's favor.
90 1 TRIAL, supra note 53, at 59 (quoting Johnson's request for Stanton's resigna-
tion).
9, See President Andrew Johnson, Veto of the Civil Tenure Bill (Mar. 2, 1867), in
POLITICAL HISTORY, supra note 30, at 176.
See I TRIAL, supra note 53, at 47-48, 61-63.
93 See President Andrew Johnson, Veto of the Civil Tenure Bill (Mar. 2, 1867), In
POLITICAL HISTORY, supra note 30, at 176 ("IMlisfortune [in other countries] has re-
sulted from their unfortunate failure to maintain the integrity of each of the three
great departments [of government] while preserving harmony among them all.").See 1 TRIAL, supra note 53, at 39, 55-56.
95 See id. at 39-40.
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exercise an independent judgment to determine whether leg-
islation was constitutional.9 Johnson's defenders sometimes
broadened this claim to allow presidential discretion in en-
forcing legislation generally, and sometimes narrowed it such
that Johnson could refuse to comply with legislation directed
at the President himself in order to bring the statute before
the Supreme Court for review.97 In either case, however,
Johnson's departmentalist claims were the extreme extension
of his more general argument on behalf of the President as an
independent constitutional actor with unilateral powers and
substantive discretion as to their use. The President was to
be understood as the head of an equal branch of government
with his own duties, responsibilities, and powers.'
Johnson's final set of innovations was as a party leader.
Political parties were integral to the nineteenth century
American state.99 The norms and structures of the parties
were extensions of the government itself and critical features
of the larger political system. Indeed, after the election of
1800, the Constitution was altered to recognize the crucial
role of parties, and when Franklin Delano Roosevelt violated
the related norm of two-term presidencies, the Constitution
was again amended to reestablish it.'0° Martin Van Buren, an
architect of the nineteenth century party system, had justi-
fied political parties in part for their value in constraining
Presidents and elevating average citizens into government 
'1
Government patronage was a key component of the party
system, allowing electoral victors to distribute government of-
fices to their supporters. Patronage helped both to mobilize
electoral support behind parties and to coordinate the activi-
ties of far-flung government officials. A substantial portion of
the nineteenth century President's time was dedicated to the
business of filling offices." He was expected to use his con-
stitutional power of appointment to advance the goals of the
party as a whole."3 As a consequence, the President was of-
See President Andrew Johnson. Veto of the Civil Tenure Bill (Mar. 2. 1867). in
POLmCAL HISTORY, supra note 30. at 175.
See 1 TMIAL, supra note 53. at 126, 136, 200. 272, 292-93. 387-88.
SeeWHrTINGTON, supranote 13, at 132-36.
See SILaEY, supra note 67. at 125-40 (discussing popular sentiment for political
parties); STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMEICAN STATE 24-34 (1982) [herein-
after AMERICAN STATE] (characterizing "early America as a state of courts and par-
ties").
"00 See U.S. CONsr. amend. XII (restructuring the electoral college): U.S. CONST.
amend. XXII (limiting Presidents to two terms).
101 See CEASER, supra note 70, at 123-69.
0 See MORTON KELLER, AFFAIRS OF STATE 298 (1977)
'03 See LEONARD D. WHrrE. THE REPUBUCAN ERA 31-35 (1958) [hereinafter THE
REPUBuCAN ERA].
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ten a clerk who sorted through the various candidates for of-
fice forwarded to him by congressmen, senators, and party
leaders.,"
The Constitution, however, lodged the power of appoint-
ment in the President, subject only to Senate confirmation, a
potentially weak link in the patronage system. For congres-
sionally based parties, access to executive patronage was un-
comfortably dependent on presidential cooperation. As the
demand for patronage increased, expectations of a four-year
rotation of offices developed, and appointments became asso-
ciated as much with individual administrations as with par-
ties.'0 5  Moreover, Presidents would occasionally use the
spoils to threaten members of their own party over policy or
party matters, as Lincoln had in order to secure his own re-
nomination.' 6 Such behavior stretched the boundaries of
antebellum partisan norms. In his struggle with Congress,
Johnson broke them.
0 7
With few connections to the Republican Party in Congress
and facing increasing hostility from the Republican Party
generally, Johnson became an uncooperative source of pa-
tronage. Soon after taking office, Johnson was warned to
delay several appointments until the administration had time
to "know who is who and what we are doing to fortify our-
selves and the cause of right."' °s As Congress began routinely
overriding his vetoes, Johnson in turn began to limit his ap-
pointments to administration loyalists regardless of their
formal party affliation.' "  Johnson's patronage policies
caused substantial concern among congressional Republi-
cans. In the North, patronage was an important resource for
individual congressmen to maintain their positions. In the
South, patronage was viewed as an essential building block
to a sustainable Republican Party that could survive the end
of martial law."0 Repeated calls for legislative intervention in
the presidential distribution of the spoils were made, and ini-
tially rejected both for want of an adequate remedy and be-
cause of the limited immediate political impact of Johnson's
104 See i. at 33-45.
105 See f&. at 313.
106 See HARRY J. CARMAN & REINHARD H. LUTHIN, LINCOLN AND THE PATRONAGE 164-
65, 240, 281-82, 313-15 (1943); LEONARD D. WHITE, THE JACKSONIANS 313, 315, 341
(1954).
107 See WH=ITINGTON, supra note 13, at 121-32.
108 MILTON, supra note 66, at 275-76 (quoting Secretary Welles's statement to
Johnson).
109 See id. at 275-76, 311; BEALE, supranote 66, at 115-21.
10 See generally FONER, supra note 11. at 346-58 (describing party-building activi-
ties in the South).
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actions.' As the 1866 election approached, Johnson became
more aggressive. Presidential control of patronage became a
central theme of his stump speeches as he promised to "cut
off the heads of the Republicans" and "take the nipples out of
their mouths."112 Presidential patronage was regarded as a
central strategy of revitalizing the National Union Party as an
electoral force behind Johnson's leadership."
3
For Republicans in particular, presidential use of the
spoils at midterm against his own congressional party and in
favor of a presidency-centered party seemed a gross violation
of existing norms.1 'f Patronage was no longer to be used for
the good of the polity, but rather for the self-serving goals of
the President alone.' * The passage of the Tenure of Office Act
was the legislative response. Others suggested the use of the
impeachment power itself to reestablish traditional constitu-
tional understandings. Treatise writers such as John Norton
Pomeroy, Alfred Conkling, and Timothy Farrar argued that
the President's appointment and removal power was implicitly
limited by substantive constraints and that the "removal of a
meritorious" individual for political gain was an impeachable
offense."' They asserted that the congressional impeachment
power should be used to reestablish a sense of the purpose of
and constraints on presidential power."' As the Republicans
saw it, Johnson had cynically placed his own political for-
tunes above the national good, undermining national recon-
ciliation and democratic norms for the sake of personal am-
bition and hubris."8
Far from being a passive and innocent victim of congres-
sional aggression, Johnson was himself a constitutional in-
novator. In order to press his opposition to congressional Re-
III See MCKITRICK, supra note 11, at 379-94 (describing Johnson's Inability to use
the patronage effectively and the ability of his opponents to turn dismissals to their
advantage).
112 President Andrew Johnson. At St. Louis (Sept 8. 1867), in POLITICAL HISTORY.
supra note 30, at 140.
11 See BROCK, supra note 11, at 163-66; McKTTRICK, supra note 11. at 377-420.
114 See BENEDICT, IMPEACHIMENT. supra note 10. at 147.
115 See H.R. REP. NO. 40-7, at 34, 40-41 (1867) (presenting congressional attacks
on the President for his use of patronage): 2 TRIAL. supra note 53. at 27. 43. 63-64.
81, 114, 228-29; 3 TRIAL OF ANDREW JOHNSON ON IMPEACH.ENT at 32-34. 60-64. 103.
137, 163, 310 (De Capo Press 1970) (1868).
11 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES 422-39 (New York. Hurd & Houghton. 1870): see also ALFRED
CONKUING, THE POWERS OF THE EXECUnVE DEPARTMEN" OF THE GOVER.EWrr OF THE
UNITED STATES 95-139 (Albany. Weare C. Little. 1866): TIMOTHY FARRAR. ,ANUAL OF
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 453-54 (Boston. Little. Brown.
1872).
117 See FARRAR, supra note 116. at 454.
118 See MCKITRIC, supra note 11, at 384-85.
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construction, the President gambled on the strength of his
office and his ability to mobilize popular support behind his
policies. When popular support failed to emerge, he was left
exposed. Johnson's actions built on existing institutions and
ideologies, but pushed them in new directions and for excep-
tional purposes. In the context of the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury, Johnson's conception of an expansive, activist presi-
dency was extraordinary, and rather frightening. Johnson
was not just an obstacle to the partisan and policy goals of
congressional Republicans, he was increasingly a threat to
their understanding of the requirements of the American con-
stitutional system.
C. The Johnson Impeachment
and Congressional Government
The impeachment of Andrew Johnson had a partisan and
personal dimension, but it developed as a constitutional
challenge to the presidency as it was being constructed by
Johnson. A central purpose of the impeachment was to re-
construct the constitutional basis of the presidency and the
system of separated powers. "' The impeachment by the
House and trial by the Senate represented the fullest flower-
ing of congressional supremacy and symbolized the appropri-
ate location of political power under the Constitution as the
Republicans understood it. Johnson's missteps and political
weakness may have been necessary conditions for the im-
peachment, and his removal may have been its immediate
goal, but the Republicans were looking past the Johnson ad-
ministration when building their case for impeachment. The
system of congressional government of the late nineteenth
century was consistent with both the constitutional vision
put forward in the impeachment and the institutional context
within which it took place.
Presidential power was the target of the Johnson im-
peachment. Johnson had demonstrated the dangerous po-
tential of the presidency, and the impeachment was an effort
to check that threat. In order to make their case for removing
Johnson from office, Republicans were forced to attack the
office itself. Referring specifically to the presidential removal
power, House manager Ben Butler denounced the "more than
119 This is not to deny the importance of Reconstruction Itself in motivating the im-
peachment. Even after the 1866 elections gave the Republicans a secure governing
majority in Congress, Johnson remained an obstruction to Republican plans in the
South, and the impeachment helped bolster the cause of racial reform, at least tem-
porarily. See 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 18, at 219-30.
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kingly prerogative" of at-will removal." For Butler, Johnson's
example meant that "the momentous question, here and now,
is raised whether the presidential office itself (if it has the pre-
rogatives and power claimed for it) ought, in fact, to exist as a
part of the constitutional government of a free people."2' The
high crimes with which Johnson was charged were unique to
the presidency and were not analogous to normal criminal
charges or even applicable to other government officials.
Congress had included a provision in the Tenure of Office Act
making its violation a "high misdemeanor.""= Though the
House managers hardly relied on this attempt at statutory
fiat to sustain their effort to remove the President it was in-
dicative of the issues underlying the articles of impeachment
against Johnson. Johnson's abuses were unique to the
presidency and arose from the use of presidential powers.
Moreover, in order to characterize Johnson's actions as abu-
sive, the managers needed first to define appropriate presi-
dential behavior. The problem was not so much Johnson
himself as the "more than kingly prerogative" that he claimed.
The impeachment of Johnson became an effort by the Re-
publicans to explain how a President could avoid being a
king.
The impeachment became a central venue for the Republi-
cans to articulate and establish their constitutional vision of
congressional supremacy. The impeachment and trial fea-
tured elaborate arguments explaining why the President's
claims to popular leadership and constitutional independence
were misguided, and why Congress was in fact the primary
branch of the federal government.'2 Moreover, the impeach-
ment itself was held up as representative of congressional
dominance.'2 The fact that even an elected official such as
the President was ultimately accountable to Congress
through the "grand inquest" of an impeachment was taken as
evidence of the uniquely representative character of Con-
gress. In exercising the impeachment power, Congress effec-
tively is the people: "Here, at least, it may be said: 'Vox pop-
uli vox Def- 'the voice of the people is the voice of God.'"125 In
response to Johnson's claim that he merely sought to chal-
lenge the constitutionality of the Tenure Act before the Court.
120 1 TRIAL. supra note 53, at 96.
121 Ic.
12 Tenure of Office Act, ch. 1154, 14 staL 430 (1867).
123 See 1 TRIAL, supra note 53. at 84: 2 TRIAL. supra note 53. at 18. 27-28. 32. 70.
91, 228, 239, 246, 256, 427.
124 See 1 TRIAL, supra note 53. at 88; 2 TRIAL. supra note 53. at 395: FARRAR. supra
note 116, at 534.
125 2 TRIAL, supra note 53, at 18.
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House manager James Wilson declared that "we will gratify
his desire by carrying his case to the highest court known to
the Constitution of the Republic - the high court of impeach-
ment."' 26 An impeachment was the most appropriate forum
for judging the constitutionality of Johnson's actions, for his
most basic crime was his violation of the duties of his office.
The trial of Johnson would serve to establish the appropri-
ate relationship between the President and the Congress.
The spectacle of a presidential impeachment would clarify the
postbellum constitutional order and congressional supremacy
within it. Surveying the implications of the recent war and
Reconstruction, Thaddeus Stevens affirmed at Johnson's trial
that the "sovereign power in this republic is the Congress of
the United States. " 127 In the campaign of the election of 1866,
Stevens had elaborated that "'Congress is the sovereign
power, because the people speak through them; and Andrew
Johnson must learn that he is your servant and that as Con-
gress shall order he must obey.' "12 To the Republicans, as
James Wilson argued, Johnson's claims for the political and
policy independence of the President made little sense. Ulti-
mately, the national will could only be known "through the
enactments of the legislative department of the govern-
ment." 2- There was no alternative base of popular authority
from which Johnson could challenge Congress.
As argued by the congressional Republicans, Congress
was the active voice of the sovereign people. The identifica-
tion of Congress and the people was reflected in the dynamic
role of the legislature. The expansive scope of the powers
entrusted to Congress by the "necessary and proper" clause
was indicative of the legislature's special place in the consti-
tutional scheme. It was to Congress alone that the people
had given powers "ample for all the necessities of national
life" and to "adapt the administration of affairs to the chang-
ing conditions of national life."3 ° Congress was entrusted
126 CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1387 (1868). Similarly, Timothy Farrar
argued that the Senate was "a higher tribunal" above the Supreme Court specifically
in order to provide a body capable of looking beyond mere legalisms in measuring
the requirements of the Constitution. See FARRAR. supra note 116. at 533-34.
127 2 TRIAL, supra note 53, at 228.
128 BINKLEY, supra note 66, at 166 (quoting Speech at Lancaster. N.Y. HERALD, Sept.
29, 1866); see also CONG. GLOBE, supra note 82, at 177, 195, 199, 201, 214 (1868):
SIDNEY GEORGE FISHER, THE TRIAL OF THE CONSTITUTION 60, 142-43 (J.B. Lippincott
1969) (1862); E.P. Whipple, The President and Congress, ATLANTIC MONTHLY 500 (Apr.
1866) ("In any comparison between the two as to the direct derivation of their power
from the people and the States, Congress has everything in Its favor; Mr. Johnson.
nothing.").
129 1 TRIAL, supra note 53, at 684.
130 2 TRIAL, supra note 53, at 70.
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with the welfare of the people and the responsibility for re-
constructing governing structures to secure their welfare un-
der changing circumstances. In that context, the President's
effort to interpose himself as a check on congressional power
misunderstood the congressional character, for "it is not to be
presumed, even for the purpose of argument, that they would
wantonly disregard the obligations of their oath."131 Congress
organized, represented, and gave life to the sovereign people.
As a consequence, the Republicans readily portrayed the im-
peachment as a conflict between the "Chief Executive Magis-
trate" and the "people of the United States." 32 The President
was an agent of the people, but Congress was the people
themselves.
Elevating Congress in this fashion had extensive implica-
tions for the relative stature of the presidency. In contrast to
Johnson's vision of a government composed of co-equal, in-
dependent branches each responsible to the people and the
Constitution, the Republicans firmly subordinated the Presi-
dent to the congressional will. Congress alone spoke for the
people and had the right to make policy. Congress alone was
responsible for insuring the viability of the Constitution. The
President was merely an executive officer. His defining func-
tion was to "follow and enforce the legislative will," without
"uncertainties" or "discretion unless it is conceded to him by
express enactment" of Congress'33 The President's highest
obligation was to defend the statutory law, for "he is its min-
ister."' 34 In this ministerial role, Johnson had no right to
challenge congressional policy or interfere with the execution
of that policy by other "faithful and patriotic public officers." ' 3
Rather than acting as the President's personal "cabal," cabi-
net members and other executive officers were to be primarily
accountable to Congress for both the definition and the con-
duct of their duties. ' As the Tenure of Office Act and other
legislative measures indicated, the President had no intrinsic
powers to oversee or direct these lower officials whose offices
were created by Congress and whose appointment and re-
moval were ultimately controlled by Congress.'3 Congress
131 Id. at 91.
1 Id. at 231; see also id. at 15-16. 42. 67-68. 105. 109-10. 230-31. 237-38. 251-
52, 390-92.
133 1 TRIAL, supra note 53, at 687.
134 2 TRIAL, supra note 53, at 256; see also U at 26. 69. 228. 397-99: FARRAR. su-
pranote 116, at 535-45.
135 2 TRIAL, supranote 53, at 81.
36 Id. at 43; see also 1 TRIAL. supra note 53, at 112-13. 115. 676-77: 2 TRIAL. su-
pra note 53, at 27, 42-43, 63-64, 114. 228-29.
13 See WHITINGTON, supra note 13 at 126-27.
Mar. 2000]
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
could organize the executive branch as it wished.
With the crisis of the war over, the time was ripe for rein-
tug in the President and reestablishinq the central place of
Congress in controlling political affairs. ' As the House un-
derstood it, and as most senators ultimately confirmed, re-
publican government required a weak executive officer unable
to oppose the will of the legislature.139 The examples of the
American patriots and the Glorious Revolution were near at
hand for the Republicans, and the Johnson presidency read-
ily evoked the specters of Cromwell, Napoleon, and Caesar.
Johnson's impeachment was necessary not simply because of
his technical violation of the Tenure Act, but because of the
evidence it provided of presidential defiance of the express
will of Congress. Evidence of this larger "crime" could be
found in his persistent use of the veto power, in his reluctant
execution of Reconstruction, in his use of the patronage, and
in his public speeches, as well as in his suspension of
Stanton. 1
40
The success of the larger goals of the impeachment could
be secured even without the removal of Johnson. The Presi-
dent was spared to serve out the remainder of his term by the
orchestrated margin of one vote only after he sent word that
he would concede to the will of Congress in the future.
4 1
Johnson served his remaining ten months in political irrele-
vance.4 2 In the midst of Johnson's impeachment, Ulysses S.
Grant accepted the Republican nomination for President with
the double entendre of "[l]et us have peace."'" He hastened to
accept the terms of the interbranch peace, assuring the Re-
publican delegates, many of whom would soon return to
Washington to complete the vote against Johnson, that he
would "administer all laws in good faith," and that he re-
garded the President as "a purely administrative officer."'
Grant was even more emphatic in his inaugural, insisting
that he had no policy "to enforce against the will of the peo-
138 See 2 TRIAL, supra note 53, at 63, 402.
139 See, e.g., 2 TRIAL, supra note 53, at 15-16, 70, 78-79, 110-11, 123, 126, 134-
35, 144, 151-52, 176-77, 193.
140 See 1 TRIAL, supra note 53, at 96, 98, 110-13, 115-17, 120-21; 2 TRIAL at 62-
63, 70, 72, 402; H.R. REP. NO. 40-7, at 2, 37 (1867); see also Charles Mayo Ellis. The
Causes for Which a President Can be Impeached, ATLANTIC MONTHLY 88-91 (January
1867); The President on the Stump, supra note 87, at 532-33, 37-38; The ShUing of
Powers: Balances and Checks in Government, ATLANIC MONTHLY 665 (June 1871).
141 See BENEDICT, IMPEACHMENT, supra note 10, at 168-80.
142 See id. at 170-73; FONER, supra note 11, at 336-38; see generally DUNNING, su-
pra note 20, at 107.
143 Ulysses S. Grant, Letters of Acceptance of the Republican Nominees, General
Grant's Letter (May 29, 1868), in POLITICAL HISTORY, supra note 30, at 366.
'44 Id. at 365.
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ple" and assuring Congress that "all laws will be faithfully
executed whether they meet my approval or not."'" Congress
tightly restricted his appointments, and Grant explained to a
reporter that "the President very rarely appoints. he merely
registers the appointments of members of Congress.""
The conclusion of Andrew Johnson's trial marked the be-
ginning of the era of congressional government that numer-
ous commentators would observe for the remainder of the
century.147 The impeachment of the President was a con-
certed effort to establish such a constitutional order. Moreo-
ver, the impeachment was successful in this regard because
it reinforced the dominant political institutions and ideologies
of the period. Johnson's use of presidential power was re-
garded as abusive precisely because it was innovative in the
nineteenth century context. Relatively few previous Presi-
dents could claim the standing and political influence that
Johnson sought for himself, and those Presidents were lead-
ers of ascendant political movements, not obstructionists on
behalf of a defeated and disenfranchised region.' s Johnson's
weakness in the face of congressional attacks reflected a
weakness in the nineteenth century presidency more gener-
ally, and his effort to break free of those constraints was
crushed by the impeachment.
The norms of nineteenth century politics proved to be re-
silient in the face of Johnson's violations of them. The Re-
publicans' arguments for the supremacy of Congress as a
constitutional and representative institution were generally
compelling, and sitting Presidents once again refrained from
appearing as advocates in the public sphere. Presidents ap-
peared before the public as ceremonial figures conveying pa-
triotic messages, not as activists seeking political authority.
Johnson's "great exception" did not seem to be an example
worth replicating, given his failure at the polls and revulsion
at his "demagogic" appeals.1 49 Party conventions continued to
control presidential selection, and Congress continued to
dominate the conventions. As Lord Bryce observed, the late
century President was "a party man, seldom much above the
145 President Grant's Inaugural Address (Mar. 4. 1869). In d. at 416.
1
48 WHrE, THE REPUBUCAN ERA, supra note 103. at 24.
147 See, e.g., BINOEY, supra note 66. at 156-227; KEL.ER. supra note 102. at 108-
10, 297-307 (1977); WOODROW VILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GoVERiEFwT (Boston.
Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 1885); James Garfield. A Century of Congress. 40 ATIAIrIC
MONTHLY 49 (1877).
148 See SKOWRONEK, POLITICS. supra note 50. at 62-85. 130-54. 198-227.
149 See MCKITRICK, supra note 11. at 428-38; The President on the Stump. supra
note 87; TULIS, supra note 70, at 87-93.
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average in character or abilities."'" With little independent
stature prior to gaining office and few resources with which to
appeal to the public while in office, late century Presidents
were in no position to challenge congressional supremacy. As
Carl Swisher concluded, "no President during the period (ex-
cept Lincoln) added particularly to the stature of his office."51
Democracy was embodied in Congress and mass political
parties, not the presidency.
Postbellum Presidents, with only a mediated link to the
public, were unable to break free from the Republicans' lim-
ited conception of their constitutional office. Late century
Presidents were administrators, not policymakers. Although
they used their veto power with far greater frequency than
their antebellum predecessors, these Presidents focused on
trimming waste from appropriations bills and private legisla-
tion, not primarily on major policy legislation.152 President
James Garfield seemed to regret leaving Congress, com-
plaining that "[a]ll these years I have been dealing with ideas,
and here I am dealing only with persons."'63 In the midst of
the Hayes administration, Woodrow Wilson lamented that the
President was "merely the executor of the sovereign legislative
will." " Even in the context of administration, late century
Presidents were forced to struggle to overcome Johnson's leg-
acy. The congressional reaction to Johnson's effort to use the
spoils for his own political benefit kept postbellum Presidents
on a short leash in appointments and removals. Late century
Presidents had to fight for the right to choose from a menu of
congressionally approved candidates, rather than simply
rubber stamp a single legislator's choice. Presidents such as
Hayes eventually won significant victories over the Senate in
regard to patronage, but from a modem perspective, or An-
drew Johnson's, those victories were exceedingly limited. 5
Garfield argued that the President should not be reduced to a
mere "registering clerk of the Senate."'5 After his victories in
the Senate, Hayes bragged that no legislator attempts "to
dictate appointments." However, neither Garfield nor Hayes
imagined that his appointments could be used against con-
gressional interests, as Johnson hoped, or that they deserved
the kind of senatorial deference that modem Presidents rou-
,5o JAMES BRYCE, THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH 65 (1889).
151 CARL BRENT SWISHER, AMERICAN CONSTTONAL DEVELOPMENT 487 (2d ed. 1954).152 See WHrrE, THE REPUBLICAN ERA, supra note 103, at 39-40.
M KELLER, supra note 102, at 298.
1 BINKLEY, supra note 66, at 215.
t See WHITE, THE REPUBLICAN ERA, supra note 103, at 287-88.
15 Id. at 194-95.
157 Id.
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tinely expect and enjoy.'58
Consistent with this limited presidential control over the
selection of personnel, Congress favored a plural executive
that could be laterally penetrated by legislative interests
rather than the hierarchical, unitary executive favored by
Johnson.1 5 Senator John Sherman summed up this ap-
proach at the end of the century, contending that
The president has no more right to control or exercise the powers
conferred by law upon [the departments] than they have to con-
trol him in the discharge of his duties.... This limitation of the
power of the President, and the distribution of power among the
departments, is an essential requisite of a republican govern-
ment .... 6
Leonard White found that the "tacit assumption" of contem-
porary observers was that the executive branch was "a clus-
ter of department heads."1 6' The late century Congress was
not opposed to administration; in fact the executive branch
grew in both size and function during the period. Whenever
possible, however, policy discretion was placed directly in the
hands of "independent" executive branch officials, not the
President's. Congress controlled departmental duties and
budgets, and executive officials dealt with Congress directly
and without presidential consultation.'6
The Johnson impeachment was followed by a period of
weak Presidents dominated by a relatively strong Congress, a
pattern typical through much of the nineteenth century.
Congressional supremacy was consistent with both the ideo-
logical assumptions about republican government and the in-
stitutional structures of the party-based system that defined
'-s See, e.g., id. (discussing President Garfield's battle with the Senate concerning
the nomination of the collector of the port of New York).
1 There is an extensive debate over whether the founders intended the executive
to be unitary or plural, but the norms of the mid- (and especially the late) nineteenth
century clearly favored a more pluralistic understanding of the executive branch. On
the unitary executive, see Steven G. Calabresl & Kevin H. Rhodes. The Structural
ConstituTion: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153 (1992); Ste-
ven G. Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, The Unitary Executive During the First Half-
Century, 47 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 1451 (1997); David P. Currle, The Distribution of
Powers after Bowsher, 1986 SUP. Cr. REV. (1986). On the plural executive, see
Gerhard Casper, An Essay in Separation of Powers: Some Early Versions and Prac-
tices, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 211 (1989); Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous
Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725 (1996); Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein. The Presi-
dent and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1994).
16 1 JOHN SHERMAN, JOHN SHERMAN'S RECOLEc'1ONS OF FORTY YEARS ir THE HOUSE.
SENATEAND cABiNEr449-50 (New York. Werner 1895).
161 WHIE, THE REPUBUCAN ERA. supra note 103, at 47.
162 See id. at 20-31, 45-48; Daniel P. Carpenter, The Forging of Bureaucratic
Autonomy, ch. 1 (1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with The University of
Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law).
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American politics during its first century.'6 Those patterns
were not broken until the turn of the century when the in-
creased importance of foreign policy and the increasingly ac-
tive and bureaucratic national state elevated the importance
of the presidency. Only then did Presidents establish the di-
rect links with the electorate and the independent base for
governing that compelled Congress to recognize an expanded
constitutional authority for the presidency.
Johnson was a constitutional innovator who threatened
entrenched political interests and longstanding political
norms. While his impeachment was a partisan affair, con-
gressional Republicans understood Johnson to be a threat to
the constitutional order itself. The debates of the time were
filled with sustained efforts to understand the underpinnings
of the American constitutional system and its possible future.
The President's political isolation made him vulnerable to
congressional attacks, but the personal animosity that Re-
publicans developed for Johnson was equally aimed at the in-
stitution of the presidency. Johnson's presidency was con-
sumed by a struggle over who would control the
reconstruction of the nation after the Civil War, and his Im-
peachment became an effort to secure congressional control
over domestic policy and politics. As an individual, Johnson
had brought the conflict between Congress and the President
to the point of crisis, but the resulting impeachment was not
personal. His crimes were less offenses against the office
than offenses of the office. In his effort to dominate Con-
gress, Johnson tried to build the presidency into an institu-
tion that could challenge congressional supremacy. The im-
peachment demonstrated that such a challenge was not yet
sustainable and would not be tolerated.
III. BILL CLINTON, PERSONAL SCANDAL,
AND PRESIDENTIAL WEAKNESS
By contrast, the impeachment of Bill Clinton targeted the
individual, not the office. His offenses grew out of personal
scandal and were intimately connected to his own term of of-
fice. Little about his impeachment and trial suggested flaws
in the office of the presidency that needed to be corrected.
Indeed, for the Republicans it was precisely the contrast be-
163 See generally Sergio Frubbrinl, The American System of Separated Government:
An Historical-Institutional Interpretation, 20 INT'L POL. Sci. REV. 97, 97-106 (1999)
(describing "congressional predominance").
16 See SKOWRONEK, AMERICAN STATE, supra note 99, at 285-92: SKOVRONEK,
POLITICS, supra note 50, at 228-33.
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tween the stature of the office and the actions of its occupant
that necessitated Clinton's removal.'" Whereas the Johnson
episode suggested to Republicans the dangers implicit in the
presidency itself, the Clinton scandals seem to suggest merely
the character flaws of an individual President For most ob-
servers, Clinton's actions would have seemed to disqualify a
candidate from becoming President The question, however,
was whether they were of sufficient gravity to justify removing
a sitting President from office. As with Johnson, Clinton's
exposure to the impeachment threat was purely contingent-
another occupant of the office would almost certainly not
have provoked Congress to the point of impeachment. Unlike
Johnson, however, Clinton's crisis was primarily a personal
one. His struggle to retain power had great individual signifi-
cance, but relatively few implications for the nation as a
whole. As a consequence, the effects of Clinton's impeach-
ment are unlikely to extend past the expiration of his own
term of office. 16 With the constitutional stakes so small, the
impeachment effort came to seem essentially misguided. In
contrast, the impeachment of Andrew Johnson seemed a
more dramatic and significant moment precisely because the
constitutional stakes were so high. In the Clinton case, con-
gressional Republicans never really established themselves as
engaging in an important constitutional enterprise, and their
effort never gained traction.
The targets of earlier presidential impeachment efforts
were as much institutional as personal. Unlike Johnson or
Nixon, Clinton's impeachment was not preceded or followed
by efforts to constrain the institution of the presidency or
shift power from the executive to the legislative branch more
generally. As we have seen, Andrew Johnson's impeachment
came only after a lengthy struggle between the President and
Congress, during which Congress systematically stripped the
President of important powers and resources. Similarly, the
Watergate crisis of the Nixon administration and the Presi-
dent's ultimate resignation were accompanied by a variety of
in The call by Republicans, and others, for Clinton to resign from office reflects
this personal focus. Clinton's resignation by itself would solve the perceived problem
because the problem was the individual holding office. Although the Reconstruction-
Era Republicans would undoubtedly have welcomed Johnson's resignation, their
concerns about the presidency itself would not have been addressed by a resigna-
tion, and they did not call for one. Similarly, Nixon's resignation did not stop con-
gressional efforts to reform the presidency through various statutory means.
166 I am only concerned here with the constitutional effects of the Impeachment.
As of this writing, it remains possible that a political "impeachment backlash' could
emerge in the 2000 elections, which would in turn have political and policy conse-
quences beyond Clinton's term of office.
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legislative efforts to hold the modem presidency more ac-
countable, including new budget procedures, the War Powers
Resolution, restrictions on campaign financing, the institu-
tionalization of the independent counsel, and intelligence re-
forms.' 67 With both Johnson and Nixon, the actions of an in-
dividual President fed an antipathy to the office of the
presidency itself. The reaction against those two Presidents
required a reevaluation of the power of the presidency more
broadly, which was seen as facilitating individual transgres-
sions and abuses. The central question of these impeach-
ments concerned the unprecedented or problematic use of
the presidential office. Although neither President's actions
were literally unprecedented, their scope and purpose were
new, and an altered political environment gave new signifi-
cance to such presidential power." Johnson's misdirection
of the spoils and Nixon's expansion of the domestic surveil-
lance apparatus called into question the nature of the presi-
dential office. Partisan conflict and political incompetence
brought growing concerns about presidential power to a
head.
In the case of Clinton, there were no underlying doubts
about the presidency itself into which partisan conflict and
personal misjudgment might feed. Indeed, the more common
theme of commentary on the presidency during the last two
decades has been one of relative weakness. 9  Despite the
brief success of Ronald Reagan in restoring luster to the
presidency, most recent Presidents have been unable to re-
cover the sense of prestige and power that Presidents enjoyed
prior to Watergate. The presidency has more often seemed
"fettered," and presidential power has been exceedingly fleet-
ing. Although Clinton has at times proven to be a formidable
political adversary, he has not emerged as a particularly
threatening presence as had Johnson and Nixon. Instead,
after his party lost control of Congress in the 1994 midterm
elections, the President was forced to insist publicly that he
was still relevant to the policy process.'70 Even in the midst of
167 See STANLEY I. KUTLER, THE WARS OF WATERGATE 574-611 (1990); JAMES L.
SuNDQuIsT, THE DECLINE AND RESURGENCE OF CONGRESS 199-414 (1981); WHITINGTON.
suplanote 13, at 158-206.
See Barton J. Bernstein, The Road to Watergate and Beyond. The Growth and
Abuse of Executive Authority Since 1940, 40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 58 (1976).
169 See, e.g., HAROLD M. BARGER, THE IMPOSSIBLE PRESIDENCY (1984); JAMES
MACGREGOR BURNS, THE POWER TO LEAD (1984); COLLIN CAMPBELL, THE U.S.
PRESIDENCY IN CRISIS (1998); THE FETERED PRESIDENCY (L. Gordon Crovitz & Jeremy
A. Rabkin eds., 1989); MICHAEL A. GENOVESE, THE PRESIDENTIAL DILEMMA (1995);
THEODORE J. LOWi, THE PERSONAL PRESIDENT (1985).
170 See The President's News Conference, April 18, 1995, 31 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
DOC. 657 (Apr. 24, 1995).
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his impeachment, Clinton's harshest critics denounced him
as an embarrassment, not as a threat.
17'
Clinton's impeachment came at the end of a lengthy scan-
dal focusing on his personal conduct that was primarily pur-
sued by an independent counsel. Prior partisan conflicts
between the President and Congress had left a substantial
store of personal animosity against Clinton among Republi-
can legislators, and the President's preemptive position left
him politically isolated, despite his own reelection in 1996.
Nonetheless, the nature of the scandal focused on Clinton as
a person rather than as a President, an angle that the Presi-
dent and his defenders persuasively played to his advantage
in arguing against his removal from office.' The existence of
an independent counsel investigation of the President served
to further personalize the charges against Clinton. Despite
the eventual broad scope of counsel Kenneth Starr's investi-
gation, its strictly legal focus served to restrict the manner in
which eventual charges against the President would be
framed, excluding a broader context as an extended political
congressional investigation would not have. Similarly, the fo-
cus of Starr's investigation was necessarily on violations of
the criminal law. This legal orientation stripped the charges
of important political issues and further served to emphasize
the personal nature of the offenses. Clinton had erred in at-
tempting to cover up a sexual affair and in doing so poten-
tially broke the law. Such a charge hardly seemed to impli-
cate the office of the presidency in Clinton's own problems.
At the same time, House Republicans used the Starr in-
vestigation to minimize their own role in the impeachment in-
quiry. As the House Judiciary Committee hearings dramati-
cally demonstrated, Starr almost single-handedly provided
the evidentiary support for the impeachment effort. More
importantly, congressional Republicans used Starr to avoid
an extended discussion concerning the nature of the presi-
dency and impeachable offenses. For months after the initial
scandal broke, legislators avoided elaborating on their own or
171 Notably, more threatening claims about Clinton never achieved political traction
or widespread credibility. The President's plea of administrative Incompetence re-
garding the White House's possession of FBI files on members of the previous ad-
ministration seemed all too believable. Though persistent. assertions that aide Vin-
cent Foster's suicide was in fact a politically motivated murder have been confined to
fringe groups. In the midst of the impeachment. Bill Clinton reminded four times as
many Americans of John Kennedy than of Richard Nixon and most found Clinton's
crimes less serious than Nixon's. See Fineman & Cooper. supra note 2. at 28.
172 See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 4, at 305-06.
17 See Adam Clymer, Three Issues Stand Out in the Logic of the Committee's Pro-
ceedtngs, N.Y. TIMES. Dec. 14. 1998. at A37.
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the President's constitutional responsibilities in favor of
awaiting the findings of the Starr investigation. 4 Of course,
given that Starr's own efforts were evidentiary and legal
rather than constitutional, such congressional deference had
the effect of posing criminal offenses as presumptively im-
peachable offenses. Rather than discussing the nature of the
presidency, Congress urged us to wait to see whether Clinton
obstructed justice. Unsurprisingly, congressional hearings
following the release of the Starr referral focused on such
narrow questions as whether perjury was a high crime or
misdemeanor, rather than such broader questions as
whether there was an imbalance in the separation of powers
or whether modem democratic practices had altered the
standards of impeachment.1 75 Once the impeachment inquiry
focused on the possible criminality of Clinton's actions, it al-
most necessarily lost any institutional purchase.1 76
The core justification for the impeachment was the conflict
between the actions of Clinton as an individual and the offi-
cial role of the President.'7 Republicans cast themselves in
the role of saving the presidency from Clinton's offenses. The
logic of their position required them to raise the presidency to
an elevated status in order to contrast our heroic expecta-
tions of its ideal occupant with the sordid actions of its actual
incumbent. Ironically, it was the President's defenders who
had more to gain from reducing the stature of the presidency,
implicitly asserting that the President was a mere manager
not a role model. 7 For those who sought to remove Clinton,
the goal was to cleanse the presidency, not to weaken it. The
central reference point of the impeachment was the most ba-
sic virtues of the rule of law and the obligations of those who
hold public office.' 79 Republicans primarily focused on al-
leged crimes that bore little relationship to the office that
Clinton occupied. Clinton's actions equally could have been
174 See, e.g., Chris Black, Republicans Revive Impeachment Talk, BOSTON GLOBE,
Jan. 22, 1998, at A3 (discussing congressional reliance on Starr investigation).
175 See Clymer, supra note 173.
176 This is true unless the institutional question becomes one of how the electoral
system fails and allows such personalities to become President or, alternatively, how
the contemporary "politics of personal attack" fails and causes Presidents to become
criminals.
177 See 145 CONG. REC. S76 (daily ed. Jan. 14, 1999) (Trial Memorandum of the
United States House of Representatives) (summarizing the charges against President
Clinton).
178 See Jacob Welsberg, The Governor-President Bill Clinton, N.Y. TIMES MAO., Jan.
17, 1999, at 31-32. Weisberg has perceptively suggested that Clinton has helped
reshape the presidency on the gubernatorial model in which the President is more
chief executive than head of state. See id.
179 See 145 CONG. REC. S76 (daily ed. Jan. 14, 1999) (Trial Memorandum of the
United States House of Representatives).
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performed by any private citizen and would have been equally
objectionable. The necessity of impeachment did not arise
from Clinton's actions as President but from the inconsisten-
cies between his private actions and his public role. In
drawing on rationales for presidential impeachment devel-
oped against Richard Nixon, the House managers notably
skipped over such concerns as the "arrogation of power" in
order to focus on conduct "undermining the integrity of of-
fice." " Moreover, in the context of Clinton's offenses, this
became synonymous with "erod[ing] respect for the office of
the President."18' The impeachment became a replay of the
standard electoral question: Is this individual qualified to
hold public office? The focus was on the individual, not the
office.
Congressional Republicans did not offer an elaborated
constitutional vision that would define the appropriate char-
acter of the presidency or the President's place within the
larger constitutional order.'2 Such freighted concepts as "the
rule of law" were allowed to stand on their own without seri-
ous inquiry or further specification. The ways in which
Clinton's actions may have shed light on the modem presi-
dency or done lasting damage to constitutional institutions
were left unstated. The House managers did not ask what re-
sponsibilities the Constitution imposed on a President, other
than the minimal expectation that he not commit felonies
while in office. They did not ask what the conditions of con-
stitutional government were, and how the presidency might
support or undermine them. Even the purpose of the con-
gressional power of impeachment was left largely unexplored
in favor of a minimal effort to simply identify a list of "high
crimes." The managers portrayed their task as technical and
legal and ultimately uncontroversial."a In other words, the
congressional Republicans of 1999 did none of the things
that the congressional Republicans of 1868 had done. The
modem Republicans chose to portray themselves as the mere
executors of the criminal code, whereas the Reconstruction-
Era Republicans understood themselves to be constitutional
actors.
180 Id.
181 Id.
18 See RICHARD A. POSNER, AN AFFAIR OF STATE 157-58 (1999) (1t is on the ground
of disrespect for his office and for decency in the conduct of government that the
most powerful case for impeachment and conviction could have been pitched. But
neither Starr nor the Republican majority of the House Judiciary Committee at-
termpted to do tlis.").
See 145 CONG. REC. S76 (dafly ed. Jan. 14. 1999) rrial Memorandum of the
United States House of Representatives).
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It is not surprising, however, that the Republicans did not
advance a larger constitutional argument aimed at weakening
the presidency and elevating the legislature. Although the
heady days of the mid-century modem presidency are clearly
over, there is little intellectual or political support for a return
to congressional government. The congressional "resurgence"
of the Watergate period focused more on building congres-
sional independence and presidential accountability than
substituting legislative for presidential leadership." Recent
examinations of presidential powers have had more the tone
of lament over the inability of the modem presidency to fulfill
its promise than normative preference for legislative suprem-
acy.'8 Unlike the Republicans of the Reconstruction Era, or
even the Democrats of the Watergate Era, neither political
party currently views Congress as its primary institutional
home. Partisan animosity toward the presidency is decidedly
contingent and transitory, and neither party believes in either
the virtue or the necessity of weakening the presidency for
the long-term.
Despite the presidency's more limited significance in the
post-Cold War constitutional order, the Presidents of the
early twenty-first century will have institutional and political
resources to sustain their power relative to Congress that
were unavailable to Andrew Johnson and his immediate suc-
cessors. Indeed, Clinton's ability to weather successfully his
recent crisis is indicative of the vastly enhanced baseline of
presidential strength in the late twentieth century compared
to the late nineteenth. Both the structure of the party state
and a set of ideological beliefs that favored legislative su-
premacy supported the congressional government of the last
century. Despite his formal powers, Johnson could not con-
trol either the executive branch or party patronage. In trying
to build support for his struggle with Congress, he encoun-
tered entrenched norms and institutions that refused to in-
vest the President with personal popular authority. By con-
trast, the modem presidency is built on a powerful
bureaucratic state that favors executive rather than legisla-
tive power and exists within a political environment that rec-
ognizes presidential claims to democratic legitimacy.' a
Unlike the party state of the nineteenth century, the bu-
reaucratic state of the twentieth century offers substantial
political resources to the President.1 87 Although there are
164 See KurLER, supra note 167, at 607-08; WHITTINGTON, supra note 13, at 201-03.
185 See supra note 169.
186 See SIDNEY M. MILKIS, THE PRESIDENT AND THE PARTIEs 75-183 (1993).
187 See generally PERi E. ARNOLD, MAKING THE MANAGERIAL PRESIDENCY (2d ed. 1998)
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clearly limits to presidential control over the executive branch
and to presidential dominance over Congress, the modem
presidency exercises substantial influence over the executive
bureaucracy. Executive budgeting has given the President an
important role in the larger budgeting process, and Clinton
has adroitly used the budgeting process to enhance his stat-
ure relative to Congress. Executive branch personnel are not
under direct control of the President, but they are no longer
primarily loyal to Congress either and can be significantly in-
fluenced by presidential actions.1 6 The executive also now
plays a critical independent role in policymaking through the
creation of regulations. The Office of Management and
Budget, among other mechanisms, allows the President to
exercise substantial oversight of regulatory activity. Moreo-
ver, the importance of regulations to modem government
gives the President unilateral policymaking powers that have
often been exploited to circumvent Congress. Of course, the
President has substantial discretion in foreign affairs, which
remains a relatively important aspect of national political
life. " The modem President has enough chips with which to
bargain with Congress that he cannot be dealt out of the
game as were the nineteenth century Presidents.
At least as important as the President's enhanced institu-
tional power is his enhanced informal authority. When An-
drew Johnson took to the stump to advance his policies, he
was denounced as a dangerous demagogue. Presidents are
now criticized if they do not go to the public to defend their
policies often enough. Despite its analytical problems, the
idea of a presidential mandate is now well accepted. Modem
Presidents are readily accepted as national leaders and
popular representatives. 9 Their claims to represent the peo-
(tracing the development of presidential powers associated with the administrative
state); MILKIS, supra note 186 (describing the shift from party to administrative poll-
tics in the twentieth century); JAMES P. PFIFFN ER. THE MANAGERIAL PRESIDENCY (1999)
(collecting various perspectives on the power of the executive in the administrative
state); SKOWRONEK, AMERICAN STATE. supra note 99, at 285-92 (noting that the rise of
the bureaucratic state produced expanded responsibilities and powers for the Presi-
dent).
18 See generally Terry M. Moe, The Prestdency and the Bureaucracy: The Preslden-
tia Advantage, in THE PRESIDENCY AND THE POLITICAL sYSTEM (Michael Nelson ed.. 5th
ed. 1998) (explaining presidential advantages in controlling bureaucracy).
189 See generally Louis FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER (1995) (detailing the devel-
opment of presidential war powers since World War 11).
See generally SAMUEL KERNELL. GOING PUBLIC: NEW STRATEGIES OF PRESIDENTIAL
LEADERSHIP (3d ed. 1997) (discussing the tendency of modem Presidents to appeal to
the public directly); LowI. supra note 169 (discussing the increasingly personal na-
ture of presidential leadership); RICHARD E. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE
MODERN PRESIDENTS 3-9 (1990) (noting changes in presidential leadership); TUtIs.
supra note 70, at 117-204 (discussing the emergence of modem presidential leader-
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pie are at least as great as those of the legislature. In con-
trast to the partisan print media of the nineteenth century,
the modem media favors Presidents and often takes them as
the personification of the government as a whole. 9' Modem
media, campaign structures, and party nomination proce-
dures facilitate the development of personalized presidential
authority that relies on neither party nor constitutional of-
fice."9 Such resources are independently accessible to the
President and are both source and symptom of a radically
transformed democratic sensibility that helps sustain presi-
dential power against legislative encroachment. 93 Thaddeus
Stevens's declaration that Congress is the people would
hardly be plausible in a modem context, and without it con-
gressional government is not viable. Indeed, the apparatus of
modem opinion polling and electronic mass media constantly
put Congress on the defensive during the impeachment by
challenging the representative credentials of legislators.'
For the nineteenth century Republican Congress, the presi-
dential impeachment symbolized legislative supremacy and
the identity of the people and their legislative representatives.
For the twentieth century Republican Congress, the presi-
dential impeachment highlighted the multiple claimants to
popular authority in the modem era and the political resil-
ience of the presidency.
A future President may find him or herself in a position
similar to Bill Clinton's. The relative power of the modem
presidency cannot fully insulate individual Presidents from
scandal and constitutional checks, as Richard Nixon discov-
ered. Historically, threats of presidential impeachment have
arisen when strong-willed Presidents have adopted an ag-
gressive posture in a climate of political isolation.9 5 Andrew
Johnson, Richard Nixon, and Bill Clinton found themselves
in a capital dominated by their political opponents. Their ef-
forts to advance their respective agendas in this unfavorable
strategic climate bred hostility and contempt not only among
their political enemies but also from their putative political
allies, even as the struggle encouraged rigidity and paranoia
IV)'See SHANTO IYENGAR & DONALD R. KINDER, NEWS THAT MATrERS 124 (1987).
192 See LowI, supra note 169, at 62-80.
1 See generally KERNELL, supra note 190; LOWI, supra note 169, at 67-133:
MARTIN P. WATTENBERG, THE RISE OF CANDIDATE-CENTERED POLTCS (1991).
19 See, e.g., Berke, supra note 2: Adam Clymer, Starr's Remarks Sway Few, Polls
Show, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1998, at All: Andrew Ferguson, Speaking for the Ameri-
can People..., TIME, Oct. 19, 1998, at 50: Paul Leavitt, End the Trial Now, Public
Sas in Polls, USA TODAY, Jan. 25, 1999, at 4A.
See SKOWRONEK, POLITICS, supra note 50, at 44-45.
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in the White House. ' 9 Such political conditions are likely to
arise again in the future, and a similar drama of bitterness,
scandal, and miscalculation may be played out But such
future impeachment efforts would not reflect any immediate
legacy of the Clinton crisis. In this regard, Bill Clinton's ex-
perience may be closer to John Tyler's. Tyler also faced calls
for an impeachment after a series of increasingly bitter strug-
gles with Congress. The impeachment effort against Tyler
stalled, however, in the House. 97 As with Clinton, Tyler's
troubles with Congress were personal, not institutional.'s
The Tyler episode had no effect on the presidency, and with
the next election the crisis was forgotten. Similarly, there is
little to gain from reforming the impeachment power itself in
reaction to the transitory difficulties of the Clinton presi-
dency.'9
IV. THE IMPORTANCE OF CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS
The Clinton impeachment was so unsatisfying in part be-
cause it seemed so constitutionally unimportant. The heavi-
est artillery in the constitutional arsenal was called out to
address a scandal of the meanest character. Despite a
numbing amount of commentary on the scandal, there was
surprisingly little effort to explain the constitutional value of
an impeachment. Republicans seemed to assume that
Clinton had defaulted on his presidency and could be re-
moved from office on a technicality. The President and his
defenders, of course, were in no position to advance a rich
constitutional defense of the presidency, but they seemed
content to exploit Republican weaknesses. With its foreor-
dained outcome and sordid subject matter, the impeachment
was a constitutional crisis only in its banality.
The House's rather reductionist approach to the constitu-
tional text should not be surprising. Given the relative clarity
of the President's offenses and the ambiguity of the Constitu-
tion's requirements, advocates of impeachment had immedi-
1 See id. at 44-45, 444-45; Stephen Skowronek, The Risks of "Thlrd-Way" Politics.
SOcIETY, Sept-Oct. 1996, at 32.
197 See Lonnie E. Maness & Richard D. Chesteen. The First Attempt at Presidential
Impeachment: Partisan Politics and Intra-Party Conjlict at Loose. 10 PRESMEtrIAL
STUD. Q. 51 (1980) (discussing the attempted impeachment of President TIYler).
198 Tyler's alleged offenses were personal in that they concerned his -moral and po-
litical character." his "shameless duplicity," and 'corrupt use of the veto power to
gratify his personal and political resentments against the Senate of the United
States." They were not personal, however. in the sense of concerning "prlvate7 af-
fairs. Id. at 56. 58.
19 See Keith E. Whittington, Do We Need a New Understanding of Impeachable Of-
fenses?, 99 POL'Y REV. - (2000).
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ate strategic reasons for minimizing discussions of the pur-
poses of impeachment.2 0 But this thin deliberation on the
meaning of Congress's constitutional responsibilities is also
unsurprising given the historical and intellectual context of
this impeachment. Our recent impeachment experience has
emphasized relatively clear cases of criminal wrongdoing by
public officials. The long drama of Watergate in the 1970s
and the spectacle of criminally convicted and imprisoned fed-
eral judges in the 1980s were relatively easy cases that em-
phasized criminality as the sufficient condition for impeach-
ment."  The reliance on an independent counsel's grand jury
investigation of presidential misconduct as a prelude to a
congressional impeachment inquiry further highlighted the
criminal, and essentially private, dimensions of this probe.
Recent academic commentary on the impeachment power has
been overwhelmingly legal in its orientation, or else narrowly
historical.2°  It was predictable, therefore, that the House
would approach impeachment in a highly formalistic man-
ner- a mechanical matter of comparing discovered facts to
an implicit list of "impeachable offenses." As the public dis-
interest, if not active disapproval, of the Clinton impeachment
suggests, this formalistic emphasis is not enough.
Asking what constitutes an impeachable offense is not
quite the same as asking why Congress might impeach. The
listing of impeachable offenses involves an abstraction that
quickly loses significance in the context of an actual im-
peachment investigation. "Crimes" that seem real and sig-
nificant in the abstract may seem trivial in a given political
context, even as actions that seem innocent in the abstract
may take on a more ominous cast within a given political
situation. The mantra of "obstruction of justice" had a rather
different meaning in the context of Watergate than in the
context of "Zippergate," just as Johnson's midterm removal of
executive officials meant something different than the pa-
tronage activities of his predecessors. As Reconstruction-Era
Republicans recognized, their political and constitutional task
200 The Senate trial, however, did expose the Republicans' inadequate preparation
for establishing the precise nature of the presidential offenses as well.
201 The House's trial brief primarily relied on those 1980s precedents to Justify re-
moval in this case. See 145 CONG. REc. S74 (daily ed. Jan. 14, 1999) (Trial Memo-
randum of the United States House of Representatives).
See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTiTUTIONAL PROBLEMS (1973)
(examining the historical uses of impeachment); CHARLES L. BLACK, JR.,
IMPEACHMENT: A HANDBOOK (1974) (considering the nature of impeachable offenses
and a list of crimes and wrongdoing); ELEANORE BUSHNELL, CRIMES, FOLLIES, AND
MISFORTUNES (1992) (describing past federal impeachments); MICHAEL J. GERHARDT,
THE FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT PROCESS (1996) (emphasizing the original understanding
of impeachment as a congressional power).
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was to explain why Johnson's actions threatened the health
of the republic, not to minutely examine the phrase "high
crimes and misdemeanors."
A focus on defining the category of impeachable offenses
invites an exercise in textual interpretation. Consideration of
the scope of impeachable offenses almost necessarily leads to
an examination of the historical roots and founding intent
behind the pregnant term "high crimes and misdemeanors."
It is unsurprising, if somewhat ironic, that both academic
commentators and interested politicians became faithful ad-
herents of original intent when they sought to interpret the
Constitution's impeachment clauses.20 In the midst of an
impeachment drama, however, such debates are likely to
seem merely academic in the worst sense. They are also
likely to be inconclusive. British history, discussions at the
founding, and subsequent practice suggest that "impeachable
offenses" is more of a constrained set than a determinate
list.2  Interpretive analysis might suggest that the scope of
impeachable offenses has some recognizable limits- Gerald
Ford's claim that the House could define the term however it
wants notwithstanding.' We know, for example, that the
limitation of the impeachment power to high crimes and mis-
demeanors was understood by the founders to exclude re-
moval of officers for innocent policy errors or "maladminis-
tration."' Likewise, only a specific act- the commission of a
"high crime"--- can trigger an impeachment inquiry. A gen-
eral assessment that an individual is incompetent or wrong-
headed is insufficient. An impeachment is not a vote of con-
fidence.0 7 But there is an unusually large set of "hard cases"
See John 0. McGinnis. Impeachable Defenses. 95 POLY REV. 27. 27-29 (1999).
2D4 Compare BERGER, supra note 202. at 56-107, w/th PETER CHARLES HOFFER &
N.E.H. HULL, IMPEACHMNTS IN!AERICA, 1635-1805 (1984). See generally Michael J.
Kiarman, Constitutional Fetishism and the Clinton Impeachment Debate. 85 VA. L
REV. 631 (1999).
2D5 See 116 CoNG. REC. 11,913 (1970) (statement of Rep. Gerald Ford) (asserting
that an impeachable offense "is whatever a majority of the House of Representatives
considers [it] to be).
2W During the Convention, George Mason moved to add 'maladministration' to
treason and bribery as additional grounds for removal under the Impeachment
Clause. After objections by Madison (for vagueness) and Morris (for irrelevance). Ma-
son withdrew the language and substituted -other high crimes and misdemeanors
against the State." JAMES MADISON. NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL COWEN1fO, OF
1787, 605 (indexed ed. 1987).
2W Even this fairly clear requirement can create some complications. however.
General competency concerns can usually be framed around some specific objec-
tionable action. For example, the primary reason for removing Judge John Pickering
from the bench was his increasing alcoholism and mental instability, but the specific
charges against him focused on his conduct in a single trial. See WIInRA, PLU ER.
WILLIAM PLUMER'S MEMORANDUM OF PROCEEDINGS IN THE UNITED STATES SEATE. 1803-
1807. 99-100 (Everett Somerville Brown ed.. 1923). The Pickering impeachment
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at the fuzzy boundary of the term.
In any case, simply providing a definition of impeachable
offenses is unlikely to be satisfactory to those who must de-
termine whether to act on them. In the recent House hear-
ings on the meaning of impeachable offenses, scholarly wit-
nesses were quick to reassure worried congressmen that the
House had discretion on whether to impeach, even upon the
presentation of clear evidence of an unambiguously impeach-
able offense °.2 08 But the concept of discretion does not capture
the considerations at stake in an impeachment inquiry. Al-
though the recognition of discretion does emphasize that Im-
peachments are not a mechanical act upon discovery of evi-
dence of the commission of one of a predetermined set of
crimes, the idea of discretion also seems to imply that con-
gressmen may ignore what they regard as impeachable ac-
tions by the President and that the decision to initiate an im-
peachment turns on considerations unrelated to the
Constitution. Thus, "discretion" implies, for example, that
Congress could recognize that a President has committed an
impeachable act, but choose not to impeach him because he
is of the same party as the majority of Congress and because
doing so would be politically damaging to Congress. "Discre-
tion" suggests that the scope of impeachable crimes is fixed
and clear, but that the prosecution of those crimes Is op-
tional. It reinforces the assumption that we already know
what high crimes are, and that in any given case we must
merely decide whether they have been committed and
whether to punish them.
In fact, the rationale for a presidential impeachment must
be constructed through the process itself.2  Impeachments
prompted President Thomas Jefferson to complain that impeachment was "a bun-
gling way" to remove unfit judges. Id. at 101.
Somewhat differently, it Is clear that many congressional Republicans thought
the fundamental problem with President Andrew Johnson was his policy views on
Reconstruction; the impeachment effort fed on that concern. The high crime re-
quirement slowed and structured the impeachment movement, but It did not stop It.
After several attempts, Radical Republicans were able to find a set of specific actions
that could form the basis for an impeachment, even as Senator Simon Cameron as-
sured his Pennsylvania constituents that he never thought a "low white of the South
was fit to become President." MILTON, supra note 66, at 378.
208 See, e.g., Background and History of Impeachment: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 89
(1998) (statement of Cass R. Sunstein); id. at 241 (statement of William Van Alstyne).
But cf. Sunstein, supra note 4, at 300 n.79.
209 This is not to suggest that the justification for an impeachment can never be
clear-cut or that every impeachment must become an exercise in constitutional con-
struction. The impeachments of many federal judges have been simple exercises of
removing clear offenders. The nature and significance of presidential offenses are
unlikely to be so obvious, however, and the removal of a high official necessarily
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require judgment. They are not the mechanical application of
the law of the Constitution. They are products of the consti-
tutional judgment of high political officials. There is simply
not a single moment of decision in which congressmen lay the
requirements of the Constitution against the actions of a gov-
ernment official and observe whether the acts are covered by
the law. 10 The entire decisionmaking process of impeach-
ment is suffused with constitutional considerations. In the
case of the Johnson impeachment, congressional Republi-
cans well understood this aspect of their political task. For
Reconstruction-Era Republicans, constitutional sensibilities,
policy preferences, and partisan calculations were conjoined
and provided the motivation and justification for the im-
peachment."' In the case of Clinton, the impeachment was
never placed within a compelling constitutional context Re-
publicans allowed Starr to explain what Clinton had done,
and they were unprepared to explain why it mattered. With-
out an explanation of the constitutional significance of
Clinton's actions, the congressional reaction seemed out of
proportion with the underlying events. If the President had
shown bad judgment in conducting his affair and his effort to
cover it up, Congress seemed to show bad judgment in seek-
ing to truncate his regular term of office. As the Republicans
were unable or unwilling to frame their efforts in constitu-
tional terms, the impeachment was easily framed in familiar
partisan terms. The point is not that the House Republicans
should have emulated their predecessors in their substantive
goal of weakening the presidency and strengthening Con-
gress. The modem Republicans did, however, need to engage
in a debate over the principles behind the impeachment
power and explain why an impeachment was substantively
justified in this case. As the Clinton scandal wore on, any
political consensus over the scope of impeachable offenses
broke down. Critics of the President needed to rebuild those
constitutional foundations and not simply try to interpret and
apply putatively settled law.1
raises more serious questions than the removal of an appointed district court Judge.
210 Ronald Dworkin makes a similar point in arguing against the distinction be-
tween enumerated and unenumerated rights, noting that the distinction leads inter-
preters to look for lists of items included within the scope of some given constitu-
tional phrase. As he argues. however. .Ithe key issue in applying these abstract
principles to particular political controversies is not one of reference but one of In-
terpretation, which is very different" RONALD DWORKIN. FREED0M'S LAW 78 (1996).
Although the "high crimes and misdemeanors" clause looks, at first glance. more like
it refers to an implicit list than states a political principle, historic practice suggests
otherwise.
211 See supra notes 119-46 and accompanying text.
212 The Reconstruction-Era Republicans likewise engaged in a separate debate over
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Although the impeachment of Andrew Johnson has been
portrayed as a cynical partisan putsch, the records of the pe-
riod display a rich constitutional debate over the require-
ments of a republican government and the President's place
within it. Both the Reconstruction-Era Republicans and the
President marshaled political support for their causes
through a distinctly constitutional discourse that explained
both the appropriate nature of the presidential office and the
purpose of the congressional power to impeach. The Senate
trial offered two competing visions of the future constitutional
order, and the impeachment was understood to be part of an
effort to construct that new order. Timothy Farrar, a promi-
nent Republican constitutional scholar of the period, empha-
sized the enormity of disputes over constitutional meaning,
noting that "[a]ll the iniquity of the late rebellion may be said
to have arisen out of a mere difference of opinion on a con-
stitutional question."2 3 For him, the impeachment power was
an instrument for insuring that all "[t]hose who accept the re-
sponsibility of understanding, executing, and administering
[the Constitution]... are bound to know its meaning, and to
execute it right."21 4 The impeachment and trial of Andrew
Johnson helped determine what it would mean to get the
Constitution right. The Reconstruction-Era Republicans un-
derstood that the Constitution could not speak for Itself, and
their attack on Johnson was centrally concerned with estab-
lishing what the Constitution meant. It is perhaps unsur-
prising that a century later we no longer find all of their con-
stitutional project compelling, but there is little doubt that
their project was constitutional in purpose. 5 Moreover, the
constitutional project of the Reconstruction Era was con-
structive and creative. Those Republicans were seeking to
explicate and redefine inherited constitutional norms, not
just mechanically apply previously accepted standards.
the proper scope of the impeachment clause that complemented and was informed
by their understanding of the separation of powers. See WHrTTINGTON, supra note 13,
at 140-52.
213 FARRAR, supra note 116, at 531.
214 Id.
215 Interestingly, in his account of the constitutional politics of the Reconstruction
era, Bruce Ackerman combines the two historical positions that are most consistent
with our modem sensibilities. consistent with the post-civil rights revisionism, Ack-
erman endorses the Reconstruction Republicans' substantive goals of racial egali-
tarianism. Ackerman ignores, however, the institutional goals of the congressional
Republicans. Instead, he emphasizes Lincoln as a precedent for post-New Deal pre-
sidentialism. In doing so, he effectively removes the Republican Congress from its
institutional context by portraying It as an extraordinary constitutional convention
rather than an instance of nineteenth century legislative supremacy. See 2 Acker-
man, supra note 18, at 120-252; see also Rogers S. Smith. Legitimizing Reconstnic-
tior: The Limits of LegalIsm, 108 Yale L.J. 2039, 2056-62 (1999).
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The impeachment of Bill Clinton is notable, by contrast,
for the shallowness of its constitutional discourse. Whereas
the Republicans of the nineteenth century understood their
task to be fundamentally political, the Republicans of the
twentieth century hoped to render their task as essentially
technical. Rather than being a "grand inquest," the im-
peachment power was to become a mechanism for enforcing
the criminal law. The House managers hoped to be mere
prosecutors, not constitutional actors. The sense of consti-
tutional failure that surrounds the Clinton impeachment in-
dicates how misguided that self-conceptualization was. The
issue is not whether Clinton's offenses were "private" or
"public," serious or minor. The issue is whether they impli-
cate important constitutional principles that need to be made
explicit and reinforced through congressional action. In
sharp contrast to its predecessors, the contemporary Repub-
lican Congress was unwilling or unable to situate the Presi-
dent's actions within a larger constitutional framework that
could explain the necessity of an impeachment. In the end, it
could not effectively state what the lesson of the Clinton im-
peachment should have been. Ignoring the educative and
constructive function of an impeachment, the contemporary
Republicans focused only on the particulars of the past, re-
ducing the impeachment to mere punishment of an individ-
ual. As a consequence, they were neither able to muster po-
litical support for their immediate effort nor to establish the
kind of vibrant constitutional norms that make congressional
government possible.
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